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ABSTRACT  
 
his study examines the current state and future prospects of Russia’s defence 
industry (OPK) from the economic perspective. The authors analyse the op-
erating conditions and competitiveness of the companies in the sector. The 
focus is on the general development trends that characterised the sector in the 2010s, 
the development policy pursued by the Russian government, structural and funding 
arrangements and the financial standing of selected companies, based on the analysis 
of economic indicators (financial statements analysis). Using the findings as a basis, 
the authors assess whether the sector is in a position to achieve the goals set for it in 
the near future. 
 
The defence industry plays an important role in Russia, politically, militarily and eco-
nomically. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the coun-
try’s economy, the sector was plunged into a crisis. Two decades later, the sector had 
re-emerged as a major player and it has been extensively restructured over the past 
ten years and made into vertically integrated state-owned corporations. At the same 
time, the sector has been given a major boost by the state armament programme 
(GPV), under which 70% of the Russian Armed Forces equipment should be state of 
the art by the year 2020. The sector is also expected to diversify its production and 
focus more on civilian items. The hope is that the defence industry can serve as an 
engine for a new innovation economy. 
 
The financial situation of the companies seems to have stabilised over the past ten 
years even though many of the corporations still suffer from poor profitability and 
high debts. The Russian government has supported the sector by means of aid pro-
grammes and debt relief, and defence industry companies have in fact been able to 
maintain a high level of capital expenditure in relation to depreciation. As a whole, 
the defence industry has been able to meet the targets set out in the state armament 
programme, which is an indication of substantial improvements in production capac-
ity.  
 
At the same time, however, the sector is still highly dependent on the state budget 
and the number of private investors is small. It would seem that the companies are 
spending very little on research and development. Moreover, gradual political isola-
tion and attempts to achieve self-sufficiency by substituting imports with domestic 
production are not compatible with the diversification strategy. All this means that 
there is unlikely to be any substantial growth in commercially successful civilian pro-
duction in the coming years.
T 
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FOREWORD 
 
his working paper provides a contribution to the current debate on Russia by 
presenting an in-depth analysis of the financial standing and competitiveness 
of the country’s largest defence industry companies.  
 
The research used as a basis for the working paper is part of an extensive research 
project, the results of which were published in the research report Russia of Power in 
March 2019. The work was commissioned by the Finnish Ministry of Defence, Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
Aleksi Päiväläinen (M.Sc. Eng. and Econ.) has produced the analysis of the economic 
indicators and the conclusions presented in the report. Karoliina Rajala has assisted 
in the compilation of the report’s second chapter discussing the development of the 
defence industry.   
 
The authors would like to thank Juha-Matti Lehtonen for critical comments on the 
production-economic aspects discussed in the report, Samuli Sjögren for assistance 
in the analysis of the companies’ economic indicators and Mathieu Boulègue for a 
valuable exchange of views. 
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1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objective and structure of the study 
he defence industry complex (hereafter the ‘defence industry’ or ‘OPK’) plays 
a key role in Russia, politically, militarily and economically. Under the military 
doctrine of the Russian Federation, the sector is part of the state military 
organisation (in Russian военная организация государства). According to the doc-
trine, OPK is developed as a broad-based high-technology sector of the country’s 
economy that is able to meet the material needs of its armed forces and secure Russia’s 
global position as a source of high-technology products and services. The doctrine 
sets out 15 wide-ranging development tasks for the sector, from research and inno-
vation and international cooperation to ensuring Russia’s technological independ-
ence.1 
 
The defence industry is also an important economic actor because it employs an esti-
mated two million people and accounts for between five and six per cent of Russia’s 
industrial output and for about ten per cent of the value of its manufacturing industry. 
Russia is also one of the world’s largest arms exporters: according to one estimate, it 
holds the second place with a share of about 20%.2 The Russian government also has 
high expectations of OPK as a source of new success stories in the civilian sector and 
as an ‘innovation engine’ attracting investors. 
 
Considering the role played by Russia’s defence industry, relatively little has been writ-
ten on the subject. The focus in Finnish research on foreign and security policy issues 
concerning Russia has been on political matters, military strategy and military tech-
nology. The purpose of this study is to add to our knowledge of the topic by examin-
ing it from the industrial and economic perspective. The authors examine defence 
industry companies as economic actors in the current Russian political context. They 
analyse the financial standing and competitiveness of these companies and assess 
                                              
1 Военная доктрина Российской Федерации 2014, [http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8-
deb3530.pdf], referred to on 15 April 2019.  
2 Juola, Cristina; Aleksi Päiväläinen, Karoliina Rajala, Laura Solanko & Ville Tuppurainen: Resources of Russia’s 
defence industry, in Russia of Power, ed. Terhi Ylitalo, Ministry of Defence, Helsinki, [http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN: 
978-951-663-060-4], referred to on 15 April 2019, pp. 81, 85, see also Juola, Cristina: Venäjän puolustusteollinen 
yhteistyö Kiinan ja Intian kanssa 2010-luvulla. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Helsinki 2018, [http://urn.fi/ 
URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3057-1], referred to on 15 April 2019; SIPRI, 10 December 2018. Global arms industry: 
US companies dominate the Top 100; Russian arms industry moves to second place. [https://www.sipri.org/ media/press-
release/2018/global-arms-industry-us-companies-dominate-top-100-russian-arms-industry-moves-second-
place]. Referred to on 23 April 2019. 
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2 
whether the sector is in a position to meet the goals set for it by Russia’s political 
leadership. At the same time, authors also attempt to form an overall picture of the 
administrative and economic mechanisms used by the Russian government to steer 
and develop the defence industry. 
1.2 Research questions  
The authors sought to find answers to the following research questions:  
 
1) What are the goals set by the Russian government for the country’s defence 
industry? 
2) How is the Russian government seeking to achieve these goals? 
3) How competitive are the companies in the sector? 
4) Is the defence industry in a position to meet the goals set by the country’s 
government? 
 
The second chapter of the report starts with a brief look at a number of key develop-
ments that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The focus is on the goals 
set for the defence industry by the Russian government. After that, the authors review 
the means by which the government is seeking to achieve these goals. In recent years, 
they have included federation-level armament and development programmes (which 
have served as funding channels), innovation and research programmes, and large-
scale corporate restructurings.  
 
The results achieved by the defence industry with these means are analysed in the third 
chapter. Finally, the authors present their conclusions and assess whether the defence 
industry is in a position to meet the goals set for it. 
1.3 Research methods and criteria 
The financial situation of the companies and their operations are key factors in the 
analysis of their competitiveness. In this study, competitiveness is primarily examined 
from a quantitative perspective on the basis of financial statement analysis. Tradition-
ally, the Russian defence industry has been a highly secretive sector, which has limited 
access to financial data. However, over the past ten years, as part of wider reforms, 
transparency has improved and new reporting practices have been adopted. The larg-
est companies in the sector in particular have published IFRS-based financial state-
ments, which have also included annual reports. This has been prompted by legislative 
changes and an active policy pursued by the Russian Ministry of Finance, and all these 
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developments have been in line with wider efforts to modernise the country’s econ-
omy and to improve the business environment.3  
 
However, with the cooling of the relations between Russia and the West, especially 
following the introduction of the economic sanctions, there have been moves towards 
more secrecy again. Under a legislative proposal submitted to the State Duma by the 
Russian government in late 2017, defence industry companies in particular would be 
able to hide financial statements information more comprehensively than before. In 
the critics’ view, the new law is so broadly written that it would give companies un-
necessarily wide leeway in concealing information and, consequently, weaken access 
to market information more extensively than is required from the national security 
perspective. This might also make Russia as a whole less attractive in the eyes of po-
tential investors.4 
 
It seems that the rights provided under the new legislation have also been used as 
none of the companies analysed in this study has published full IFRS-based financial 
statements (including notes) after 2016. Companies still publish financial statements, 
but they often leave out important information stating that this has been ordered by 
the government. 
 
The authors rely on literature available in English and Russian as source material. The 
economic analysis of the defence industry draws on the IFRS-based financial state-
ments published by the largest corporations, and these are used as a basis for an anal-
ysis of economic indicators concerning profitability, solvency and liquidity. The eco-
nomic indicators and the factors behind them are analysed and compared with two 
European companies operating in the same sector. 
 
To facilitate the comparisons, the financial statements based on Russia’s own RAS 
code have not been used as source material. There are still differences between RAS 
and IFRS even though efforts have been taken in recent years to make the former 
more compatible with the international standards. For example, there may be sub-
stantial differences in turnover figures, depending on the standards used. Moreover, 
RAS-based financial statements are not consolidated in a consistent manner, which 
makes group-level comparisons difficult and time-consuming. Using RAS-based fig-
ures and making reliable comparisons would have required more research resources 
than were available for this study. 
                                              
3 Bankir.ru, 18 June 2013, Применение МСФО в России в соответствии с Законом «О консолидированной 
финансовой отчетности». Вопросы и ответы. [https://bankir.ru/publikacii/20130618/primenenie-msfo-v-
rossii-v-sootvetstvii-s-zakonom-o-konsolidirovannoi-finansovoi-otchetnosti-voprosy-i-otvety-10003551/], re-
ferred to on 15 April 2019. 
4 Интерфакс, 21 November 2017, Правительство запросило право освобождать компании от раскрытия 
информации. [https://www.interfax.ru/business/588358], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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For these reasons, the authors decided to use IFRS-based financial statements in the 
calculation of the economic indicators. Reports on operations were used as a basis for 
key data on the companies and details of their operations. The most comprehensive 
information on these matters was available for the years between 2013 and 2016 and 
for this reason, the authors focused on this period. 
 
The list of the world’s 100 largest arms-producing companies published each year by 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was used as the second 
criterion for selecting material for the study. This list contains several Russian com-
panies. The aim was to ensure that the focus in the analysis would be on the large 
companies relevant to the overall picture.  
 
Using the above criteria, the authors selected the following five companies for detailed 
review: OAK, OSK, Vertolety Rossii, ODK and Uralvagonzavod. For reasons of 
general interest and political connections, Kalashnikov (known for its assault rifles) 
was also added to the list. Each of the companies was analysed from the perspective 
of profitability, liquidity and solvency. The authors also examined the volume of cap-
ital expenditure and R&D expenditure as well as their ratio to depreciation and turn-
over. The economic indicators only include research and development items entered 
as annual expenditure in the income statements, which means that development ex-
penditure capitalised in the balance sheet has been left out. Balance sheet items are 
examined separately in connection with the financial analysis of each company. 
 
The following economic indicators were collected and calculated for each company: 
- turnover 
- operating profit (EBIT) 
- profit/loss for the period 
- return on capital employed (ROCE) 
- gearing  
- equity ratio 
- current ratio 
- number of employees 
- capital expenditure (intangible and tangible assets) 
- capital expenditure to depreciation ratio 
- research and development expenditure (in absolute terms and relative to turn-
over) 
In 2016, these companies employed a total of about 360,000 persons and their com-
bined turnover amounted to about RUB 1,273 billion. This means that they account 
for nearly 20% of the two million people employed by the sector as a whole. This can 
be considered a fairly comprehensive percentage even though not all subsectors are 
equally strongly represented. A large number of companies building aircraft and ships 
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are included whereas companies in electrical technology, electronics and information 
technology industries are absent from the list.  
 
The details and economic indicators of the analysed companies plus the calculation 
formulas used are presented in Appendices 1 and 2. The table below shows the guide-
line values of the economic indicators and they are based on the guidelines issued by 
the Finnish Company Advisory Board.5  
Table 1. Guideline values of specific economic indicators.6 
 Interpretation 
Indicator Excellent Good 
Satisfac-
tory Fair Weak 
Return on capital em-
ployed (ROCE) 
more than 
15% 
10–15% 6–10% 3–6% 
less than 
3% 
Gearing 
less than 10% 10–60% 60–120% 120–200% 
more 
than 
200% 
Equity ratio 
more than 
50% 
35–50% 25–35% 15–25% 
less than 
15% 
Current ratio 2.5 
2-2.5 1.5-2 1-1.5 
less than 
1 
 
 
Capital expenditure has been calculated on a cash flow basis and any purchases by 
subsidiaries are included. Sales or divestments have not been deducted from the sums. 
 
With regard to research and development, adequate funding largely depends on the 
sector and the company’s strategy. This matters is discussed in more detail in the 
conclusions. 
 
In the field of competitiveness, the authors focus on a quantitative indicator analysis 
and for this reason, the perspectives of strategic management, such as Porter’s com-
petitiveness frameworks, are not considered. The second focus area is on the analysis 
of business economics, which means that general political developments are also out-
side the scope of the study. 
 
  
                                              
5 Alma Talent tunnuslukuopas, [https://www.almatalent.fi/tietopalvelut/tunnuslukuopas], referred to on 15 April 
2019. 
6 ibid. 
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1.4 Abbreviations used in the study 
The Russian and Western abbreviations used in the study are presented in Table 1. 
Both the full words behind the abbreviations and the explanations are given. 
 
Table 2. Abbreviations used  
Russian ab-
breviation 
Full words Description 
ВПК Военно-промышленная 
комиссия 
Military-industrial commission 
chaired by the President 
ГОЗ Государственный оборонный 
закас 
State defence order 
ГПВ Государственная программа 
вооружения 
State armament programme 
МСФО Международные стандарты 
финансовой отчётности 
International accounting standards 
(In this study ‘IFRS’) 
ОПК Оборонно-промышленный 
комплекс 
Defence industry complex (defence 
equipment industry) The term ‘de-
fence industry’/OPK is used in this 
study. 
РСБУ 
RAS 
Российские стандарты бухгалтер-
ского управления 
Russian Accounting Standards 
Russia’s national accounting stand-
ards 
ФПИ Фонд перспективных 
исследовании 
Russian Foundation for Advanced 
Research Projects (Russian equiva-
lent to DARPA) 
Western ab-
breviations 
  
DARPA Defence Advanced Research Pro-
jects Agency 
Research organisation of the US 
Armed Forces 
EBIT Earnings before interests and taxes Profit/loss before taxes and financ-
ing income and expenses (operat-
ing profit) 
ROCE Return on capital employed  
R&D Research and development  
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2 
DEVELOPING THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
2.1 Background and goals  
n the Soviet Union, the defence industry was a key part of the country’s planned 
economy. According to some estimates, the defence industry accounted for as 
much as 25% of the country’s gross domestic product in the 1980s. Efforts were 
made to restructure the defence industry as part of the reform programme introduced 
by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. Dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led 
a deep downturn, which drove many of the production plants into difficulties.7 
 
The development of Russia’s defence industry after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union can be roughly divided into three phases: collapse, adoption of market econ-
omy principles and state control. The collapse is considered to have started with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and it continued until the mid-1990s. The process 
of adopting market economy principles continued to about 2005, after which the Rus-
sian government has systematically strengthened its role in the country’s defence in-
dustry.8  
The disintegration of the Soviet system also meant a restructuring of the defence in-
dustry sector. Russia lost the industrial capacity located in the republics that had se-
ceded from the Soviet Union even though links with such states as Ukraine remained 
strong until 2014. The economic downturn led to cuts in defence spending and arms 
production, which plunged the defence industry into a prolonged crisis.9 Between 
1991 and 1994, state funding was reduced to about one seventh of what it had been 
at the end of the Soviet period. By 1996–1998, the output of the defence industry had 
fallen by 80% and the workforce by about two thirds from the peak years of the 
1980s.10  
 
At the same time, many defence industry companies were privatised, machinery and 
movables were sold at bargain prices, while factories were converted into shopping 
                                              
7 Bystrova, Irina: Russian Military-Industrial Complex. Aleksanteri Papers, 2/2011, pp. 7–8. 
8 Kosals, Leonid; Aleksei Izyumov & Bruce Kemelgor: From the Plan to the Market and Back – The Organi-
sational Transformation of the Russian Defence Industry. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 70, 2018, pp. 1450–1471. 
9 Bystrova (2011), pp. 7–8. 
10 Kosals et. al. (2018). 
I 
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centres and later into arts and event centres.11 Companies engaged in export business 
were able to maintain at least some of their production capacity, which helped them 
to survive the worst years of the downturn. Between 1994 and 2001, exports doubled, 
from about USD 1.7 to 3.5 billion. State-owned companies were more successful as 
exporters than privatised ones.12   
 
As a whole, the Russian defence industry was in a difficult situation at the start of the 
2010s. Companies were burdened by debts that they had accumulated during the crisis 
years, low productivity and outdated production machinery. According to some esti-
mates, up-to-date machinery (less than ten years old) accounted for less than 20% of 
all production equipment and only about one per cent of this machinery was replaced 
each year.13  
 
In 2010, the Russian government decided to launch a new armament programme 
(GPV-2020), which marked a turning point in the development of the country’s de-
fence industry. The programme, totalling about RUB 20,000 billion, was four times 
larger than the previous programme (GPV-2015).14 The main objective of the new 
programme was to raise the proportion of up-to-date weaponry from about 15 to 
70% of the armed forces’ equipment by the year 2020.15 Moreover, in line with the 
import-substitution thinking, the aim was to increase the domestic content of weap-
ons systems so that Russia would be less dependent on foreign components and sys-
tems.16 In addition to these goals, the defence industry was also expected to function 
as the ‘innovation engine’ of the Russian economy. The key idea is that the research 
and product development work carried out in the defence industry should also have 
                                              
11 Коллегия Военно-промышленной комиссии Российской Федерации: Диверсификация ОПК: Как 
побеждать на граждансих рынках, 2017 [http://www.instrategy.ru/pdf/367.pdf], referred to on 7 November 
2018. 
12 Kosals et al. 2018, see also Pynnöniemi, Katri; Alpo Juntunen, Katja Koikkalainen, Juha-Matti Lehtonen, 
Kari Liuhto, Mikko Niini, Seppo Remes, Laura Solanko & Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: The Russian defence indus-
try and its development guidelines until 2020, in Russia of Transformations, ed. Terhi Ylitalo, Ministry of Defence, 
Helsinki 2012, [https://www.defmin.fi/files/2345/Russia_of_Transformations.pdf], referred to on 15 April 
2019, p. 37 
13 Федоров, Юри: Государственная программа вооружений-2020, Власть и промышленность, Индекс Бе-
сопасности. № 4 (107), 2012, [http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/12/13880454280.pdf], referred 
to on 15 April 2019. 
14 Центр АСТ: Государственные программы вооружения Российской Федерации: проблемы исполнения и потенциал 
оптимизации, Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, 2015, [http://cast.ru/files/Report_CAST.pdf], re-
ferred to on 15 April 2019, pp. 8–9. 
15 Connolly, Richard & Mathieu Boulegue: Russia’s New State Armament Programme – Implications for the Russian 
Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027, Chatham House, London 2018. [https://www.chatham-
house.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-05-10-russia-state-armament-programme-con-
nolly-boulegue-final.pdf], referred to on 15 April 2019, p. 4. 
16 Juola et. al (2019), p. 83. 
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civilian applications so that it can help to make Russian technologies more competi-
tive in the global markets.17 The aim was that by the year 2025, civilian production 
should account for 30% of the defence industry’s output and as much as 50% by the 
year 2030. In recent years, Russian leaders have repeatedly stressed that the defence 
order boom has passed and that defence industry companies should seek growth and 
opportunities in new markets. This is widely known as the diversification strategy.18  
Achieving the objectives would require improvements in the production capacity and 
competitiveness of the defence industry. To make this possible, a large number of 
development programmes have been prepared over the years. Innovation clusters and 
centres modelled on the Silicon Valley in the United States have also been established 
in recent years. The following chapter starts with a brief description of the key actors 
in the Russian defence industry, after which the authors present the objectives of the 
main development programmes and assess the results achieved so far. 
2.2 Political steering of the research activities and key actors 
The objectives set by Russia’s political leadership for the development of the coun-
try’s defence industry were described above. On the one hand, the aim is to achieve 
the goals laid out in the state armament programme, while on the other hand, the 
sector is also expected to develop civilian products that can find buyers in the global 
market. These partially conflicting policy decisions have been made by Russia’s top 
leadership. Decision-making and discussions on issues concerning the defence indus-
try take place on official and unofficial forums, and one of the most important of 
them is the military-industrial commission (VPK).   
 
The year 2006 can be considered as the start of the renaissance of Russia’s defence 
industry. That year, the military-industrial commission (in Russian Военно-
промышленная комиссия Российской Федерации) and the committee responsible 
for defence materiel purchases were re-established, while the sector itself was more 
extensively harnessed for meeting the needs of the country’s own armed forces.19 The 
military-industrial commission is responsible for the comprehensive development of 
                                              
17 Лента.ру, 17 October 2012, Путин подписал закон о создании Фонда перспективных исследований, 
[https://lenta.ru/news/2012/10/17/arf/], referred to on 12 July 2018, see also Pynnöniemi et. al. (2012) pp. 
40–41.  
18 Военно-промышленная комиссия РФ (2017), see also ТАСС, 4 March 2019, Борисов: темпы роста про-
изводительности труда и выручки в ОПК выше средних по стране. [https://tass.ru/armiya-i-
opk/6182770], referred to on 15 April 2019, Ведомости, 28 July 2018, Власти предупредили предприятия 
ОПК о возможном падении гособоронзаказа. [https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/news/2018/07/28/ 
776788-vlasti-predupredili-predpriyatiya-opk], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
19 Bystrova (2011), p. 14, see also Указ Президента РФ от 20.03.2006 № 231 “О Военно-промышленной комиссии 
при Правительстве Российской Федерации”, 20 March 2006. 
  
10 
Russia’s defence industry. Its members include the Deputy Prime Minister responsi-
ble for national defence, Minister of Finance, Minister of Defence, Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff and the heads of the Russian intelligence agencies.20 Since 2007, the state 
defence order has been prepared under the auspices of the commission, and this order 
serves as a basis for the purchases of weapons and defence materiel.21 The commis-
sion also plays a key role in the coordination of the cooperation between the Ministry 
of Defence, Russian Defence Forces and the defence industry. The commission is 
supported in its work by the collegial body of the military-industrial commission op-
erating under the auspices of the Russian government and comprising the heads and 
chief designers of several defence industry companies.22 
 
In addition to the commission, the following bodies also play a key role in the inno-
vation activities of the defence industry: Scientific and Technology Policy Council of 
the Ministry of Defence, Presidential Council for Economic Modernisation and In-
novative Development, and the Council for Science and Education.23  
  
The current debate is a continuation of the initiatives launched during the tenure of 
President Medvedev, which sought to boost technological modernisation in Russia. 
One of these initiatives was the Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects 
(FPI) (in Russian Фонд перспективных исследований), which operates under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Defence. The foundation, which was established in 2012, 
is seen as the Russian equivalent to the DARPA research institute in the United States. 
The foundation is tasked with technology anticipation, coordination of the develop-
ment of new high-risk technologies, and other activities boosting innovation activities 
in Russia. At its establishment, the foundation was envisaged as a platform for about 
150 different projects and it was planned to recruit between 100 and 150 people to 
work on them.24 The current focus in FPI’s research work is on three areas: chemical, 
biological and medical projects, physical and technological projects, and information 
projects.25 Ideas for such projects are often collected through competitions.26 It was 
                                              
20 Президент России (2019), Военно-промышленная комиссия Российской Федерации, [http://www.kremlin.ru/ 
structure/commissions#institution-41], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
21 Bukkvoll, Tor: The Russian Defence Industry – status, reforms and prospects, Norwegian Defence Research Estab-
lishment (FFI), 2013, [https://www.ffi.no no/Rapporter/13-00616.pdf], referred to on 29 May 2019, see also 
CSIS: CSIS Presents: The Russian Military-Industrial Complex, video, 20 June 2017, [https://www.csis.org/events/ 
russian-military-industrial-complex-2017], referred to on 30 June 2018. 
22 Правительство Российской Федерации: Коллегия Военно-промышленной комиссии Российской Федерации, 2019 
[http://government.ru/department/300/members/], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
23 Adamsky, Dmitri: Defense Innovation in Russia: The Current State and Prospects for Revival. IGCC Defense 
Innovation Briefs, (5), 2014, pp. 1–12. 
24 Лента.ру, 17 October 2012, Путин подписал закон о создании Фонда перспективных исследований, [https:// 
lenta.ru/news/2012/10/17/arf/], referred to on 12 July 2018. 
25 Фонд перспективных исследований: О Фонде. [https://fpi.gov.ru/about/], referred to on 13 August 2018. 
26 РИА Новости, 28 December 2017, Глава ФПИ рассказал о работе фонда. [https://ria.ru/20171228/ 
1511892040.html], retrieved on 1 April 2019. 
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reported last year that FPI is working on about 50 different projects and that more 
than 40 laboratories had been established to support them in higher education insti-
tutions, research institutes and defence industry companies in different parts of Rus-
sia. A research body focusing on technologies and robotics operating under the aus-
pices of FPI was established in 2015.27 However, there is disagreement on the results 
achieved by the foundation so far.28 
  
However, the foundation is not the only actor responsible for developing innovation 
for the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. The best known of the other centres is 
the Skolkovo technology park, launched during the tenure of President Dmitry 
Medvedev. It is modelled on the Silicon Valley, and considerable resources have been 
channelled to the project by the Russian government.29 The results achieved at Skol-
kovo have, however, been only a fraction of what was originally envisaged, and Rus-
sia’s scientific community has criticised the state for not channelling resources to in-
stitutions carrying out long-term research.30 It also seems that government funding 
for Skolkovo is drying up, as the technology park has sought funding from foreign 
venture capital investors in recent years.31 
 
The latest in the series of research centres is the innovation complex Era in the city 
of Anapa on the Black Sea coast, which was opened in autumn 2018.32 The Era pro-
ject was launched in 2017 at the initiative of Russia’s Ministry of Defence and the 
project was given the final go-ahead by President Putin in June 2018.33 The purpose 
of the innovation centre, which covers an area of about 17 hectares, is to serve as a 
research cluster of Russia’s defence industry, and it is hoped to attract young experts 
in particular. It is envisaged that the complex will employ more than 2,000 researchers 
and engineers by the year 2020.34 The research work will comprise the following eight 
                                              
27 РИА Новости, 20 March 2018, ФПИ предложил Минобороны стандарты для искусственного интел-
лекта. [https://ria.ru/20180320/1516808875.html], referred to on 3 April 2019. 
28 Adamsky (2014), p. 10. 
29 Федеральный закон от 28.09.2010 № 244-FZ “Об инновационном центре ‘Сколково’”, 21 September 
2010. 
30 Kuzina, Svetlana & Vladimir Fortov: What’s destroying Russian Science?, Russkiy Mir Foundation, 5 February 
2012. [https://russkiymir.ru/en/publications/140319/], referred to on 10 April 2019. 
31 Butcher, Mike: Chill Out – Russia’s Skolkovo Project attempts a re-boot with a new venture fund, TechCrunch, 2017 
[https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/09/chill-out-russias-skolkovo-project-attempts-a-re-boot-with-a-new-
venture-fund/], referred to on 3 April 2019. 
32 РИА Новости, 22 November 2018, Путин высоко оценил военный технополис в Анапе. [https://ria.ru/ 
20181122/1533306121.html], referred to on 13 April 2019. 
33 Евдокимова, Анастасия: Путин подписал указ о создании военного технополиса в Анапе, Телеканал «Звезда», 
25 June 2018. [https://tvzvezda.ru/news/opk/content/201806252151-543h.htm], referred to on 12 July 2018, 
see also Указ Президента Российской Федерации № 364, “О создании Военного инновационного технополиса 
«Эра» Министерства обороны Российской Федерации”, 25 June 2018. 
34 Гундарев, Алексей: Военный технополис «Эра» начнет работать в сентябре, Телеканал «Звезда», 27 June 
2018. [https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201806271101-fs5o.htm], referred to on 12 July 2018. 
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areas: data processing and artificial intelligence systems, robotic structures, super 
computers, technical vision and modelling, information security, nanotechnology and 
nanomaterials, and energy as well as biosynthesis and biosensor technologies. The 
aim is to create breakthrough and dual-use technologies and develop both basic and 
critical military technologies. Researchers at ERA will work in close collaboration with 
their counterparts in FPI. 
2.3 Development programmes and innovation in Russian defence industry 
As described above, the Russian government is determined to modernise the techno-
logical base of the country’s economy. In his 2018 policy speech, President Putin set 
guidelines for the development work by demanding new revolutionary innovations 
from the defence industry.35 He also reminded his listeners that technological back-
wardness threatens Russia’s national security. The speech was a continuation of the 
policy decisions described above, the aim of which is to enhance the competitiveness 
and production capacity of the defence industry.36 
In fact, a larger number of complementary and parallel strategies and plans have been 
announced in Russia in recent years, and their aim is to channel resources to techno-
logical development, training and other areas of innovation in the defence industry. 
Between 2010 and 2017, the Russian government adopted more than 50 official doc-
uments concerning technologies, research and innovation.37  
 
The Russian innovation development strategy adopted during Medvedev’s presidency 
is one of the key documents from the perspective of the defence industry. One aim 
of the strategy, which extends to the year 2020, is to achieve better sharing of infor-
mation between the defence industry and the civilian sector, and to develop dual-use 
technologies.38 The second key document steering innovation activities is the scien-
tific-technological development strategy for the Russian Federation, which was 
adopted in 2016. It sets out the goals and priorities for scientific and technological 
development in Russia and the measures to be taken to achieve the goals. 
 
However, the defence industry development programme, adopted in May 2016 and 
updated in spring 2019, is probably the most important of these policy documents. 
The document has three focus areas: enhancing productivity in the defence industry, 
developing innovative products, and increasing domestic content of the products. 
                                              
35 Путин, Владимир: Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию, 1 March 2018. [http://krem-
lin.ru/events/president/news/56957], referred to on 30 June 2018. 
36 Kashin, Vasily: Russian Defense Innovation in the 2010s. SITC Research Briefs, 10(8), 2018, p. 2. 
37 Adamsky (2014), p. 7. 
38 Правительство Российской Федерации: Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 8 декабря 2011 г. N 2227-
р, 8 December 2011. О Стратегии инновационного развития РФ на период до 2020 г. (с изменениями и допол-
нениями). 
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The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for the implementation of 
the programme, the purpose of which is to boost product development, and enhance 
the competitiveness of the defence industry both domestically and in the international 
markets. A 1.9-fold increase in industrial output, increasing the proportion of inno-
vative products to 39.2% and a 2.95-fold increase in labour productivity by the year 
2027 (from 2015 levels) are some of the targets set out in the programme. Practical 
aims of the programme include the promotion of defence industry exports, ensuring 
stable production and growth in output, personnel development, and making the sec-
tor more innovative.39 
 
In addition to the defence industry development programme, there are also a number 
of other development programmes under way. These are listed in Table 2. According 
to official figures, a total of about RUB 2,796 billion has been made available through 
these instruments, and the lion’s share of the sum (about 84%) has been allocated to 
the development of the aircraft industry and space activities. Even though the overall 
figure may not be precise, it can nevertheless be considered as indicative. In addition 
to receiving public funding, the companies participating in the programmes must 
probably also bear some of the programme costs themselves.40 
  
                                              
39 Правительство Российской Федерации: Постановление от 6 февраля 2019. Н 85-6, 6 February 2019. О 
внесении изменении в государственную программу Российской Федерации “Развитие Оборонно-промышленного ком-
плекса”. [http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/docs/#!postanovlenie_pravitelstva_rf_856_ot_06_fevralya_2019_goda], re-
ferred to on 28 June 2019. 
40 Коммерсантъ, 30 October 2018, «Не может быть на десять самолетов заказано десять ракет», [https:// 
www.kommersant.ru/doc/3785647], referred to on 15 April 2019, see also Новости ВПК, 12 February 2019, 
Развитие ОПК: Правительство утвердило новую редакцию госпрограммы развития оборонной про-
мышленности, [https://vpk.name/news/245916_razvitie_opk_pravitelstvo_utverdilo_novuyu_redakciyu_ 
gosprogrammyi_razvitiya_oboronnoi_promyishlennosti.html], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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Table 3. The most important OPK development programmes and the funding allocated to 
them.41,42,43,44,45.. 
Name of the development programme Years Sum appropri-
ated (RUB bil-
lion)  
Developing the aircraft industry 2013–2025 990 
Developing shipbuilding  2013–2030 326 
Developing radio technology and the electronics industry 2013–2025 52 
Developing Russia’s space activities 2016–2025 1,353 
Developing the defence industry complex 2019–2027 75 
Total  2,796 
 
Some of the funding for R&D also comes from the defence industry companies them-
selves but as shown by Appendix 2, these sums are fairly modest. The income state-
ments of the companies reviewed in this study show that the R&D expenditure en-
tered as expenditure during the financial year varies between zero and 1.88% (per-
centage of turnover, Appendix 2). It should also be noted that many companies have 
capitalised development expenditure into their balance sheets, which means that the 
overall situation is not as bad as the figures would indicate. This issue is examined in 
more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
In recent years, Syria has played a major role in the development of new military 
equipment as Russia has been testing many of its new weapons systems in that coun-
try.46 Defence Minister Shoigu told the Defence Committee of the State Duma in 
March 2019 that Russia has tested more than 316 new or modernised weapons in 
Syria.47 Some of the products tested over the past four years have been experimental 
systems or prototypes that had not yet undergone normal test cycles before being 
                                              
41 Минпромторг Российской Федерации: Государственная программа Российской Федерации “Развитие авиаци-
онной промышленности на 2013–2025 годы”, [http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/common/upload/files/docs/ 
Vizualizatsiya_GP_RAP_140507.pdf], referred to on 29 June 2019. 
42 Правительство Российской Федерации: Постановление от 31 марта 2017 N 374, 31 March 2017. Об 
утверждении государственной программы Российской Федерации “Развитие судостроения и техники для освоения шель-
фовых месторождений на 2013-2030 годы”. (с изменениями и дополнениями). [http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/ 
common/upload/files/docs/374_31_2017.pd], referred to on 28 June 2019. 
43 Правительство Российской Федерации: Распоряжение от 15 декабря 2012 г. N 2396-р. Об утверждении 
государственной программы Российской Федерации “Развитие электронной и радиоэлектронной промышленности на 
2013 - 2025 годы”. [http://government.ru/docs/3345/], referred to on 28 June 2019. 
44 Минэкономразивития Российской Федерации: Интернет-ресурс “Федеральные целевые программы”, 
[http://fcp.economy.gov.ru/cgi-bin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/ViewFcp/View/2017/443], referred to on 29 June 
2019. 
45 Правительство Российской Федерации 6 February 2019. 
46 IISS: The Military Balance 2018, Routledge, p. 169. 
47 Государственная Дума: Состоялось расширенное заседание Комитета по обороне, 11 March 2019. [http:// 
duma.gov.ru/news/30006/], referred to on 3 April 2019. 
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taken to Syria. It should also be noted that many of the tested weapons were later 
rejected.48  
2.4 Financing arrangements 
The Russian defence industry relies on three key instruments for financing. The first 
of them is direct budget funding through the state armament programme, which is 
channelled via the yearly state defence order (GOZ) (in Russian Государственный 
оборонный заказ). Money for three purposes has been allocated through GOZ: pur-
chases of new weapons, modernisation and repairs of existing weaponry, and research 
and development. Breakdown of GPV-2020 expenditure in the period 2011–2020 is 
shown in Table 4. About RUB 7,000 billion of the RUB 20,000 billion originally allo-
cated to the programme will probably remain unused. Only the end total of RUB 
1,600 billion was disclosed in 2016, and no details of the breakdown were given. It is 
noteworthy that during the second half of the programme, the emphasis has been on 
the purchases of new equipment at the expense of weapons modernisation. The esti-
mates of the funding for 2019 and 2020 are based on the commonly held view that 
the fat years of GPV are over. 
 
Table 4. Breakdown of the state defence order under GPV-2020.49 
Cost category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
(EST) 
2020 
(EST) 
2011–
2020 
Purchases of new 
equipment (RUB mil-
lion) 
366 447 550 943 1,188  956 1,015    
Equipment modernisa-
tion (RUB million) 
92 108 178 290 360  144 150    
R&D (RUB million) 115 122 165 218 252  346 285    
Total (RUB million) 573 677 893 1,450 1,800 1,600 1,446 1,450 1,550 1,550 12,989 
Purchases of new 
equipment (%) 
64 66 62 65 66  66 70    
Equipment modernisa-
tion (%) 
16 16 20 20 20  10 10    
R&D (%) 20 18 19 15 14  24 20    
 
Extensive use of advance payments has been one of the typical features of GPV fund-
ing. By the end of 2017, advance payments by the Ministry of Defence had reached a 
cumulative total of nearly RUB 3.5 trillion, which was 2.5 times as high as the GOZ 
                                              
48 IISS (2018), p. 170. 
49 Экспорт вооружений publications between 2015 and 2018. 
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of the same year.50 Under the rules introduced in 2016, advance payments have ac-
counted for between 10 and 40% of the contract value. This arrangement has been 
mainly used in long, capital-intensive projects and it has ensured the liquidity of the 
defence industry companies, many of which are in extremely poor shape financially.51  
 
In addition to direct budget funding, companies have also been able to draw on a 
guarantee system, which was introduced in the years 2011 and 2012 to enhance flex-
ibility and to meet the industry’s funding needs. In this arrangement, specific banks 
were able to provide arms manufacturers with state-guaranteed loans at an interest 
rate of 10%. In fact, companies made extensive use of this financing instrument, and 
the loan portfolio had already reached about RUB 1,200 billion by the end of 2016. 
The problems were compounded by the fact that some banks had apparently been 
quite generous in their lending and had not bothered to check the companies’ ability 
to repay the loans. Finally, at the end of 2016, the Russian government came to the 
rescue and paid back loans totalling about RUB 800 billion. In the same connection, 
it was also decided to discontinue the lending scheme.52 
 
In addition to purchasing military equipment, the Russian government has also pro-
vided the defence industry with funding through a number of development pro-
grammes, which are listed in Table 1 in Chapter 2.3. 
2.5 Developing the pricing system used in the state defence order  
The pricing principles applied in the state defence order are an important economic 
consideration for OPK companies. Though seemingly of technical nature, this factor 
is essential for ensuring the operational prerequisites of OPK companies as GOZ still 
remains the main source of turnover for most of them. For at least ten years now, the 
pricing principles have been a constant source of friction between the Ministry of 
Defence and the companies in the sector. According to the analysts monitoring the 
sector, the system is extremely bureaucratic and poorly compatible with the realities 
of the market economy.53 Private companies have complained that the negotiations 
are unnecessary cumbersome and involve too many stages, and they also claim that 
the prices demanded by the government negotiators are unreasonably low and that 
sometimes they are without any basis in reality.54 
                                              
50 Зацепин, В.Б. & В. И. Цымбал, Институциональные изменения, Институт экономическои ̆ политики 
имени Е.Т. Гайдара, Российская экономика в 2017 году. С. Г. Синельникова-Мурылева (ed.), Москва 
2018: pp. 338–587, [https://iep.ru/files/text/trends/2017/Book.pdf], referred to on 26 June 2018. 
51 Фролов, Андрей: Исполнение государственного оборонного заказа России в 2016 году. Экспорт воору-
жений, Июль-Август 2017. 
52 ibid. 
53 Центр АСТ (2015). 
54 Коллегия Военно-промышленной комиссии РФ 2017. 
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Traditionally, the prices of military equipment have been regulated by the govern-
ment. The pricing of the purchases made within the framework of GOZ has been 
based on the costs attributed by the suppliers to the development and manufacturing 
of the materiel. Profits have been on the basis of the 20+1 rule, under which the 
supplier can add a profit margin of 20% to the costs arising from its own input. In 
other words, the input ordered from subcontractors and other partners is first de-
ducted from the manufacturing costs, after which a maximum profit of 20% is calcu-
lated for the remaining part. At the same time, a profit of only one per cent is permit-
ted for subcontracting. Subcontracting often accounts for a large proportion of the 
total work; for example, in 2017, prime contactor allocated 57% of the GOZ to the 
subcontractor chain.55 Defence industry representatives have publicly estimated that 
the average profit margin for the projects carried out within the framework of GOZ 
is usually approximately between three and five per cent.56,57 Probably because of the 
20+1 rule, companies have been unable to include depreciation and financing ex-
penses in the manufacturing costs, which means that they have to deduct them from 
the profit calculated on the basis of this rule. 
 
It should also be noted that the suppliers at the start of the order-delivery chain are 
exempted from the regulation, and thus prices of such items as raw materials and 
semiconductor materials and the prices of imported items have consistently been de-
termined on a market basis.58 
In the context of the development of the sector and especially from the customer’s 
perspective, the key problem arising from the regulation has been that it has not pro-
vided any incentives to cut costs. On the contrary: efficiency improvements have led 
to lower profits. This has often encouraged companies to inflate break-even costs.59,60 
At the same time, the one-per cent rule has made subcontracting fairly unprofitable, 
which has prompted companies to minimise purchases of subsystems and compo-
nents from external suppliers. The view has been that this has considerably strength-
ened already large OPK companies, created monopolies and substantially weakened 
the chances of small and medium-sized private companies to join the order-delivery 
chain of GOZ.61  
 
 
                                              
55 Фролов, Андрей: Исполнение государственного оборонного заказа России в 2017 году. Экспорт воору-
жений, Июль-Август 2018. 
56 Коммерсантъ 30 October 2018. 
57 Коллегия Военно-промышленной комиссии РФ 2017. 
58 Федеральная антимонопольная служба: Интервью с заместителем руководителя ФАС России Максимом Ов-
чинниковым по вопросу внедрения мотивационной модели ценообразования в сфере государственного оборонного заказа, 
21 February 2018, [https://fas.gov.ru/p/contents/2099], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
59 ibid. 
60 Boulegue & Connolly (2018). 
61 Коллегия Военно-промышленной комиссии РФ 2017. 
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The policy described above has probably also substantially reduced the willingness of 
private actors to invest in the sector, which in turn has made it more difficult for OPK 
to reduce its dependency on the state budget. Lack of private funding has at least 
partially been compensated by the development programmes discussed in the previ-
ous chapter. Attention in the public debate has also been on the price formation, 
which is on a highly inflexible basis and tied to the yearly state budget process. More-
over, it does not give any consideration to the special characteristics of business and 
project operations. For example, it has been claimed that risk management, an essen-
tial part of ordinary project business, is not in any way linked to the price formation.62 
 
It seems that the existence of these problems has been recognised, at least partially, 
because in December 2017, the Russian government adopted the decision no. 1465 
(Постановление Правительства РФ Нo 1465), under which the principles govern-
ing the pricing of the state defence order were substantially changed.63,64 
 
The introduction of the incentive model (in Russian мотивационная модель) has 
been characterised as the most significant of the reforms. The key principle is that in 
the future, companies can keep the savings that they have achieved through efficiency 
improvements. The 20+1 rule is still used to determine the basic product price (in 
Russian базовая цена) every five years. During this period, the basic price is reviewed 
each year in accordance with the indexes determined by Russia’s Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development. In other words, a ceiling has been set for the price paid by the 
customer. The basic price may, however, be reviewed during the five-year period if 
the break-even costs increase by more than five per cent, for example as a result of 
new requirements presented by the end customer or major changes in production 
volumes. In a second important change, the basic price is now defined on the basis 
of market prices whenever possible. In the past, the manufacturer’s cost price was 
used as the reference price.65  
 
                                              
62 Независимое военное обозрение, 16 August 2018, Цена обороны и оборона цены. [http://nvo.ng.ru/con-
cepts/2018-08-16/10_1009_gosoboron.html], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
63 Ведомости, 6 December 2017, Правительство утвердило единый порядок ценообразования на продукцию гособоронза-
каза. [https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/news/2017/12/06/744312-pravitelstvo-utverdilo-edinii-poryadok-
tsenoobrazovaniya-na-voennuyu-produktsiyu], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
64 Правительство Российской Федерации: Постановление от 2 декабря 2017 N 1465, 2 December 2017. 
О государственном регулировании цен на продукцию, поставляемую по государственному оборонному заказу, а также о 
внесении изменений и признании утратившими силу некоторых актов Правительства Российской Федерации. 
[http://static.government.ru/media/files/nJurC6N1kD0VixjHvJSAoGmbXKANqovO.pdf], referred to on 
28 June 2019. 
65 Федеральная антимонопольная служба 4 July 2018. Федеральная антимонопольная служба. Максим 
Овчинников: Постановление Правительства о ценообразовании в сфере ГОЗ меняет всю идеологию работы с коопера-
цией, 4 June 2018, [https://fas.gov.ru/news/25370], referred to on 15 April 2019; Федеральная антимоно-
польная служба (21 February 2018). 
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Efficiency improvements in defence industry companies, modernisation of produc-
tion technologies, improvements in management practices and attracting private in-
vestors are some of the key goals set out in the reforms. The preparations for the 
reform were mostly carried out by the Russian competition authority (FAS), which 
believes that positive results can be expected within a few years.66 
 
The easing of the price controls was criticised by the Ministry of Defence experts 
during the preparatory stage. It was feared that the changes would give too much 
leeway for companies, allowing them to introduce unjustified price increases.67 At the 
same time, however, top ministry officials have taken a more relaxed view on the 
matter and for example Deputy Prime Minister Borisov has emphasised the im-
portance of the reforms for his own administrative branch and for the companies 
themselves.68 
 
As a whole, both the authorities and key political decision-makers have high hopes of 
the price reform. It is clear that the new model will provide companies with more 
freedom of action and will thus make the system more market-based. At the same 
time, however, the state will still retain a broad range of different regulatory and su-
pervisory powers. The reform is probably a compromise achieved in lengthy negoti-
ations between parties holding diametrically opposing views who wanted to present a 
model that is also acceptable to the Ministry of Defence and supporters of a state-led 
industrial policy. 
 
The reform can also be seen as part of wider efforts to develop and modernise the 
Russian economy and to boost the diversification strategy (to substantially increase 
the proportion of civilian production). Against this background, providing companies 
with more freedom of action is in line with the industrial-strategy goals set by the 
Russian government. 
 
Well-managed companies that have already experienced free competition will proba-
bly benefit from the reform. A time span of five years will probably be a long enough 
period for most companies to enhance their management practices, achieve efficiency 
improvements and modernise production technologies. At the same time, however, 
companies still living in the operating culture of the planned economy may be poorly 
placed to develop their operations on a more independent basis. It remains to be seen 
whether the change will benefit or harm these actors.   
                                              
66 Федеральная антимонопольная служба (21 February 2018). 
67 Обозник, undated, Проблемные вопросы ценообразования на ВВСТ, [http://www.oboznik.ru/?p=55519], 
referred to on 15 April 2019. 
68 Военно-промышленный курьер, 25 September 2017, ГОЗ под микроскопом. [https://vpk-news.ru/arti-
cles/39094], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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Finally, it should be noted that these changes will in no way weaken the position of 
giant state monopolies, such as Rostec, or make it easier for small private companies 
to access the market. Thus, there is no prospect of more competition either. For this 
reason, it is unlikely that the reform alone would allow the sector as a whole to take a 
productivity leap or substantially enhance its competitiveness. 
2.6 Key state-owned corporations   
The goals set for the development of the Russian defence industry, contents of some 
of the development programmes and major actors have been described above. In this 
chapter, the authors discuss a process that has been underway for the past 15 years 
and in which defence industry companies have been built into vertical structures (huge 
state-owned holding companies). The aim of this process is to place the best compa-
nies and research institutions from different sectors under the same roof. This has 
been done to improve efficiency, to dismantle overlapping activities, to achieve ex-
tensive modernisation of the production machinery, and to restructure companies 
that are in poor shape and have accumulated substantial debts. The aim has also been 
to create attractive opportunities for a wide range of private investors.69 
 
The first state-owned companies were created in 2001 and 2002 when Sukhoi (aircraft 
manufacturer) and Almaz-Antey (manufacturer of anti-aircraft defence systems) were 
established on the orders of President Putin. The aircraft manufacturer OAK, estab-
lished in spring 2006, was the first of the large corporations.70 It was followed by the 
shipbuilding company OSK a year later.71 The multi-sector corporation Rostec and 
the nuclear weapons and nuclear power company Rosatom were also established in 
2007.72 The latest in the series is the space corporation Roscosmos, which was created 
in August 2015.73 In practice, the state ownership is managed through a federal agency 
(in Russian Росимущество).  
 
 
                                              
69 Pynnöniemi et. al (2012), pp. 36–37, see also Лента.ру, 30 March 2005, Правительство России одобрило 
создание военного авиахолдинга. [https://lenta.ru/news/2005/03/30/avia/], referred to on 15 April 2019, 
Новости ВПК, 26 December 2007, Создание госкорпораций стимулирует частные инвестиции в сектора 
экономики – Жуков. [https://vpk.name/news/12619_sozdanie_goskorporacii_stimuliruet_chastnyie_inves-
ticii_v_ 
sektora_ekonomiki__zhukov.html], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
70 Объединённая Авиастроительная Корпорация (ОАК), Финансовые отчетности 2013–2016, [https:// 
www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/company.aspx?id=11433], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
71 Объединённая Судостроительная Корпорация (ОСК), Финансовые отчетности 2014–2017, [http:// 
www.aoosk.ru/about/disclosures/], referred to on 15 April 2019.  
72 Ростех, Годовые отчетности 2014–2017, [https://rostec.ru/investors/], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
[https://rostec.ru/about/history], referred to on 15 April 2019, presentation of Rosatom, [http:// 
www.rosatom.ru/about/], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
73 Presentation of Roscosmos, [https://www.roscosmos.ru/219/], referred to on 15 April 2019.  
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The large state-owned corporations, which encompass most of the defence industry 
companies and their employees, are shown in Figure 1. The figure shows the turnover 
and personnel of each corporation and the key company clusters belonging to it. 
These vertically integrated structures often constitute multi-tier ownership structures, 
which are often highly complex and difficult to dissect. The key principle is, however, 
that the corporations of the highest tier shown in the figure are holding companies 
that in practice are state-controlled and state-owned. In most cases, the next tier is 
also similarly structured even though it may also contain companies that are partially 
or mostly in private ownership. 
 
 
Figure 1. Largest state-owned corporations and their subsidiaries, 31 December 2017. Turn-
over of Almaz-Antey and Roscosmos is based on 2016 figures (marked with *).74 
 
These six corporations employ a total of about 1.3 million people and they have a 
combined turnover of about RUB 3,570 billion. Except for Rostec, they have special-
ised in a small number of sectors. It should be noted, however, that all business op-
erations of the corporations (both military and civilian products) are included in the 
figures and the percentage of civilian production is not known in all cases. According 
to SIPRI, military production has accounted for between 80 and 100% of the output 
in recent years.75 Rosatom and Roscosmos are a clear exception to this rule as they 
generate most of their turnover in the civilian sector. However, especially in the case 
of Roscosmos, it is difficult to get an overall picture of company’s operations and to 
make a distinction between the civilian and military uses of its products. 
 
Rosatom has nuclear weapons, nuclear energy and nuclear-powered icebreakers as its 
business sectors. The first-mentioned business is grouped under the nuclear-weapons 
complex (in Russian ядерный оружейный комплекс, ЯОК), the turnover of which 
has not been disclosed. It is known, however, that the design and construction of 
                                              
74 ОАК 2017, Rosatom 2017, ОСК 2017, Ростех 2017, Roscosmos 2016, Лента.ру, 21 March 2018, Все ниже 
и ниже, [https://lenta.ru/articles/2018/05/21/cosmos], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
75 SIPRI 2018.  
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civilian nuclear power plants is the responsibility of the company AO Atomener-
goprom, which had a turnover of about RUB 747 billion in 2017. As Rosatom had a 
turnover of about RUB 967 billion and the ‘other products’ accounted for about RUB 
84 billion of this total, the nuclear weapons complex might have amounted to about 
RUB 130 billion. This also indicates that the building of civilian nuclear power plants 
is an important high-technology business for the corporation and Russia as a whole. 
 
Roscosmos was established in summer 2015 so that Russia could overhaul its space 
activities. A series of failed launches and destroyed rockets between 2010 and 2014 is 
estimated to have cost tens of billions of roubles, and this was one reason prompting 
the creation of the new corporation.76 Roscosmos has dozens of limited companies 
in its direct ownership and ORKK (in Russian Объединенная ракетно-космичесая 
корпорация) is probably the largest of them. Other important companies include 
Energija (in Russian Энергия), RKS (in Russian Российские космические системы), 
and ISS (in Russian Информационные спутниковые системы), which are partially 
owned by Roscosmos, or in which it represents the interests of the Russian govern-
ment. It is estimated that the corporation and the companies coming under it have a 
total of about 238,000 employees and that in 2016, it had an unconsolidated turnover 
of about RUB 25 billion. Implementation of the space policy of the Russian Federa-
tion and the state armament programme are two of the key tasks of Roscosmos. It is 
responsible for the GLONASS satellite system, operations and development of the 
Baikonur and Vostochny cosmodromes, and international cooperation within the 
framework of the International Space Station (ISS).77 
 
There are hundreds of smaller defence industry companies outside the large corporate 
structures described above, and two of them are important enough to warrant men-
tioning here: RTI-Sistemy and KTRV (in Russian Корпорация тактические 
ракетные вооружения). The first-mentioned develops and manufactures command 
and control systems for air and space defence, such as long-range radar systems for 
strategic missile troops. KTRV supplies missile weapons systems, especially for air 
and naval forces.78 
 
  
                                              
76 Лента.ру, 23 January 2015, Попытка №5, [https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/01/23/federalspace], referred to 
on 15 April 2019. 
77 Роскосмос, Годовой отчет 2016, [https://www.roscosmos.ru/22444/], referred to on 29 June 2019. 
78 Война и мир в терминах и определениях, Данилевиц, А.А. (ed.), Издательский дом ПоРог, Москва 2016, 
pp. 177, 181. 
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As described above, the sector has been extensively consolidated over the past two 
decades. It was announced in October 2018 that Rostec had acquired all OAK shares, 
and there was public discussion on the merger of Roscosmos, Almaz-Antey, RTI-
Sistemy and KTRV in spring 2018.79 
 
All above-mentioned companies (except for Roscosmos, Rosatom and RTI Sistemy) 
are included in the list of world’s top 100 arms-producing companies compiled by 
SIPRI. Key details of these companies can be viewed in Table 5 below. It should be 
noted that the turnover figures given in the table are based on the information sup-
plied by the companies themselves and for this reason, some of the calculation meth-
ods remain unverified. They may therefore differ slightly from IFRS-based turnover 
figures, and thus they would not be comparable with the information presented in 
Chapter 3. They nevertheless give a rough idea of the actual situation. 
Table 5. Russian companies on SIPRI’s list of world’s top 100 arms-producing companies.80   
No
. 
Company Rank 
SIPRI 
(2016) 
Turnover 
2017 (RUB 
billion) 
Number 
of employ-
ees 2017 
Owner-
ship at 
the end 
of 2018  
Main products 
1 OAK 
 
14 450 102,000 State Civilian and military aircraft 
2 OSK 19 326 95,000 State Warships 
Submarines 
Icebreakers 
3 Almaz-Antey 13 212 130,000 State Anti-aircraft defence sys-
tems 
4 Vertolety Ros-
sii 
32 230 43,330 Rostec Military and civilian helicop-
ters 
5 KTRV 
 
35 211 60,000 State Missile weapons 
6 Vysoko-
tochnye Kom-
pleksy 
46 Not known Not known Rostec Tactical missiles, portable 
anti-aircraft systems, anti-
tank missiles 
7 ODK 51 235 93,406 Rostec Engines for civilian and mil-
itary aircraft and space rock-
ets, gas turbines for ships 
and energy generation 
8 Uralvagonza-
vod 
53 153 62,208 Rostec Main battle tanks, other 
combat vehicles, railway car-
riages 
9 KRET 54 115 39,163 Rostec Radioelectronic systems and 
instruments, radars 
                                              
79 Коммерсантъ 24 October 2018, ОАК передана в состав «Ростеха». [https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/ 
3779517], referred to on 15 April 2019, see alsoИзвестия 14 March 2018, Космос — в одни руки. 
[https://iz.ru/719450/dmitrii-strugovetc-aleksei-ramm-nikolai-surkov-evgenii-deviatiarov/kosmos-v-odni-
ruki], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
80 SIPRI 2018; companies’ annual reports. 
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10 Sukhoi - 123 24,584 OAK Civilian and military aircraft 
11 OPK 57 87.2 36,797 Rostec Communications systems, 
electronic warfare systems, 
robotic complexes 
12 Irkut - 84.6  OAK  Civilian and military aircraft 
 
As shown, six of the twelve companies on the list belong to Rostec. After OAK’s 
ownership arrangements have been completed, the total will reach nine. Of the largest 
companies, only RTI Sistemy is mainly in private ownership. 
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3 
 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANIES 
he goals set by Russia’s political leadership for the country’s defence industry, 
the key policy measures, and the financing and structural arrangements in-
troduced to meet these goals were discussed in the chapter above. In this 
chapter, the authors will analyse the competitiveness of six corporations on the basis 
of their IFRS-compatible financial statements. They will first take a look at the aircraft 
manufacturer OAK and the shipbuilder OSK, after which they will examine compa-
nies coming under Rostec. The chapter concludes with a summary of the financial 
standing and competitiveness of the companies. 
3.1 OAK 
Corporate structure and business operations 
OAK (‘United Aircraft Corporation’) is a large aircraft manufacturing company 
owned by the Russian government. It has its head office in Moscow and its shares are 
traded on the Moscow Stock Exchange. OAK has Russia’s most important civilian 
and military aircraft companies, such as MiG, Sukhoi, Irkut, Ilyushin and Tupolev, as 
its subsidiaries. The company was established under a decree issued by President Putin 
on 21 February 2006. Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s Defence Minister, was appointed as the 
Chair of its Board of Directors, while Aleksey Fyodorov, former head of MiG and 
part-owner of Irkut, became the Managing Director. The company was registered at 
the end of November 2006 and the ownership transfer process was completed by 
April 2007. In 2009, the Russian government owned more than 91% of the company 
and in 2017, its ownership had exceeded 92%. The remaining shares belonged to 
Vneshekombank and private investors.81 
 
OAK is working on a large number of development projects in civilian and military 
aviation. The best-known of the military projects is probably the fifth-generation SU-
57 fighter. Modernisation of the TU-160 bombers and the design of the future PAK 
DA aircraft are probably the most important projects in the context of Russia’s stra-
tegic nuclear deterrent. The Sukhoi SSJ-100 airliner is a major civilian project pursued 
by OAK and to market the aircraft, it has established a joint venture with the Italian 
company Leonardo. The venture, SuperJet International, is based in in the Italian city 
                                              
81 Объединённая Авиастроительная Корпорация (ОАК), Финансовые отчетности 2013–2017, [https:// 
www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/company.aspx?id=11433], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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of Venice. In another international joint project, OAK is seeking to develop a wide-
body passenger airliner in cooperation with Chinese partners. The aircraft is provi-
sionally known as CR929 and it is promoted by the China-Russia Commercial Aircraft 
International Corporation, established in 2017. OAK had been working on a joint 
transport aircraft project with India for many years but in spring 2017, it was an-
nounced that it would be discontinued.82 MS-21-300 is a domestic project, in which 
Irkut is developing a commercial aircraft.83 
 
Economic indicators  
The aircraft industry has traditionally played a major role in Russia, and it has been 
one of the pillars of the country’s arms exports after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. For example, in 2015, exports accounted for 29% of OAK’s turnover and in 
2016, the figure had risen to 49%. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that OAK has 
been performing extremely poorly, which has manifested itself in losses, substantial 
debts and a low equity ratio. The company posted losses throughout the period in 
review (2013–2016). During the best years, net financing expenses ‘only’ accounted 
for about 50% of the operating margin, which is an indication of a heavy debt burden. 
In 2017, the corporation reported an operating profit of slightly less than five per cent 
but this could not be verified from the financial statements. 
 
Russia’s Ministry of Defence is the corporation’s largest single customer and in 2016, 
its purchases accounted for about 43% of the turnover. In 2015, the figure had been 
about 47%. Between 2011 and 2016, within the framework of the state armament 
programme, OAK delivered about 455 combat aircraft (more than 300 fighters, about 
50 strategic bombers and about 100 attack aircraft). Each year, the group has delivered 
between 40 and 70 fighters and a maximum of 17 strategic bombers.84 
 
The most important subsidiaries of OAK and their turnover figures are presented in 
Table 3 below. It should be noted that unlike the other OAK subsidiaries, MiG and 
Ilyushin have not published IFRS-based financial statements and for this reason, their 
figures have been calculated using RAS as a basis. The figures are thus not fully com-
parable and the operating profit percentage, in particular, should be treated with cau-
tion. 
 
                                              
82 Defence.ru, 17 March 2017, Россия и Индия свернули проект военно-транспортного самолета. [https://de-
fence.ru/article/rossiya-i-indiya-svernuli-proekt-voenno-transportnogo-samoleta/], referred to on 15 April 
2019. 
83 Объединённая Авиастроительная Корпорация 2018. 
84 Экспорт вооружений publications from the period 2015–2018, see also Объединённая Авиастроительная 
Корпорация 2017. 
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When the RAS-based income statements of MiG and Ilyushin are examined in more 
detail, two major differences with other subsidiaries are noted. Firstly, these compa-
nies do not have any administrative expenses, which significantly boosts their results. 
It is quite possible that they have relied on the administrative services provided by 
their parent company. Secondly, it seems there are slight differences between RAS 
and IFRS in the way in which expenditure is grouped. For this reason, in IFRS, EBIT 
has a completely different meaning than ‘capital gain’ in RAS. Thus, it cannot be said 
with certainty that MiG and Ilyushin are more cost-efficient than the other parts of 
the OAK corporation.  
Table 6. Financial information about the main OAK subsidiaries. Figures marked with as-
terisk (*) are from RAS-based financial statements. 
Name Year Turnover, RUB 
billion (share of 
OAK) 
EBIT-% Profit/loss for 
the period, 
RUB billion 
Profit (loss), 
RUB billion 
Sukhoi 2016 157.3 (38%) 1 -9.8 -63.2 
 2015 135.2 (39%) -32.4 -28.3 -53 
MiG* 2016 56.6 (14%) 11.6 2.8 -53.2 
 2015 42.2 (12%) 4.7 -42.9 -57.3 
Irkut 2016 108.9 (26%) 1.2 1.2 5 
 2015 84.5 (24%) -2.3 -2.3 4.6 
Tupolev 2016 23.1 (6%) -0.3 0.1 -27.3 
 2015 18 (5%) -54 -12 -27.2 
Ilyushin* 2016 14.3 (3%) 12.6 0.6 5.9 
 2015 11.6 (3%) 26.7 1.4 6 
 
According to some reports, because of a low order backlog, MiG has also been forced 
to restructure its operations by cutting workforce. For example, in summer 2017, the 
company laid off about 200 employees and a reduction of 500 was planned for the 
year 2018.85 
 
Capital expenditure has remained at a fairly high level. In most years, it has been about 
twice as high as depreciation. At the same time, research and development expendi-
ture has only accounted for about 0.2% of the turnover, which is an extremely low 
figure. It should be noted, however, that in many years, R&D has added about RUB 
40 billion to the turnover, and in 2016, for example, this accounted for about 10% of 
the total. Furthermore, in addition to the R&D expenses entered as expenditure in 
the income statement, substantial R&D items have been capitalised in the balance 
sheet. For example, in 2015 and 2016, they totalled about RUB 12.6 and 9.5 billion, 
respectively. At the end of 2016, the value of these balance sheet items totalled about 
                                              
85 Лента.ру, 1 December 2017, СМИ узнали о сокращениях в корпорации «МиГ», https://lenta.ru/ 
news/2017/12/01/migpersonal/], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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RUB 77 billion (about RUB 83 billion in 2015). The largest single contributing factor 
was the SSJ-100 project (about RUB 35 billion), followed by the MS-21 project (about 
RUB 18 billion). ‘Other projects’ totalled about RUB 14.6 billion. 
 
Such entries can only be made if the company can estimate and demonstrate with 
sufficient reliability that the products under development will generate economic ben-
efits in the future. In other words, the company must have a realistic plan detailing 
how the product under development will be manufactured and marketed. In many 
cases, the company’s R&D expenditure only partially meets this requirement so that 
it can be capitalised in the balance sheet. It seems that in OAK, nearly all development 
work has been included in this category. This may be an indication of a difficult eco-
nomic situation, in which there are simply no incentives or funds to carry out inde-
pendent research work. At the same time, it is not logical for the company to spend 
its own money on product development if it can obtain lower-risk funding in the form 
of public subsidies. In fact, the corporation has received subsidies within the frame-
work of aircraft industry and defence industry development programmes in the form 
of direct funding, investment aid and interest subsidies. In 2015 and 2016, these sums 
totalled about RUB 8.2 and 12.5 billion, respectively. 
 
Generally speaking, none of the companies in the corporation stands out in any par-
ticular way. In fact, Irkut is perhaps the least unsuccessful of them as it has been able 
to post a meagre profit on a cumulative basis. Ilyushin has also managed to the same 
but only because the company does not have any administrative costs in its accounts. 
 
In Sukhoi, the largest single factor negatively affecting the results over the past two 
years has been the Super Jet 100 airliner project. The accident in Moscow in spring 
2019 dealt a heavy blow to the project, characterised as a symbol of national pride 
and hope.86 In 2015, the company had to make a substantial (about RUB 28 billion) 
R&D expenditure write-down in its balance sheet. Penalty fees arising from this pro-
ject also created a dent of more than RUB 12 billion in the results. Thus, these non-
recurring items weakened the result by a total of about RUB 40 billion, which was 
nearly 12% of the turnover. In 2016, the same project generated a loss of about RUB 
3.5 billion, a result of inventory write-down. Details of the SU-57 project have not 
been itemised in the financial statements. 
 
At the same time, by the year 2016, Irkut had already earned more than RUB 12 billion 
from MS-21, its most important civilian project. The assumption is, however, that this 
income has originated from such sources as state development funding because the 
                                              
86 Dagaeva, Anastasia: A National Disappointment: What Went Wrong With the Sukhoi Superjet 100, 13.05.2019, 
Carnegie, Moscow [https://carnegie.ru/commentary/79108], referred to on 18 June 2019. 
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type certification of the aircraft has been postponed to at least 2020 and type certifi-
cation is a prerequisite for serial production.87 
 
All in all, OAK is a surprisingly weak giant. Despite its importance and strong exports, 
it has been a loss-making company. Surprisingly enough, not even the substantial pur-
chases made within the framework of the state armament programme GPV-2020 had 
helped to turn the losses into profits by the end of 2016. Purchases by the armed 
forces are unlikely to grow any further though at the same time, significant reductions 
are not expected either. 
 
At the same time, however, the corporation has apparently realised that it is trouble 
and has announced a series of development programmes to boost productivity. Mod-
ernisation of the production technologies and rationalisation of operating practices in 
accordance with the new industrial model have been suggested as solutions. Under 
the new industrial model, design and production functions would be concentrated in 
specialised centres of excellence. The aim is to achieve a five-fold increase in produc-
tivity by the year 2025.88 A lion’s share of the funding has been allocated to the de-
velopment programme of the Russian aircraft industry, which suggests that the Rus-
sian government considers the sector particularly important. 
 
The MiG company has also started reducing workforce, which in a manufacturer of 
such a formidable reputation can be considered an important signal. It should also be 
noted that substantial product development inputs at least partially explain the losses 
incurred by OAK. If the development investments will generate the desired results 
and new civilian and military aircraft can be introduced, the corporation may be able 
to substantially strengthen its position in the long term. 
3.2 OSK  
Corporate structure and business operations 
The OSK corporation is Russia’s largest shipbuilder. The company, which is wholly 
owned by the state, was established in 2007. In 2017, OSK had 47 subsidiaries, among 
them 21 shipyards and 12 design bureaus. The company owns most of Russia’s ship-
building capacity (according to its own estimates, the figure is about 80%). Unlike the 
other giant OPK corporations, the geographical focus of OSK’s operations lies on 
the western parts of Russia, especially St Petersburg, and the Archangelsk region on 
                                              
87 Коммерсантъ, 29 November 2018, МС-21 увяз в узлах. [https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3813832], referred 
to on 15 April 2019. 
88 Объединённая Авиастроительная Корпорация (2018). 
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the shores of the Arctic Ocean. The Arctech shipyard in Helsinki is owned by OSK.89 
 
OSK designs and builds different types of civilian and military vessels, from subma-
rines to icebreakers. Its best-known submarine projects include the Borei-class stra-
tegic nuclear-powered submarines designed by the Rubin design bureau and built by 
the Sevmash shipyard (project no. 955). Originally, eight of these vessels were envis-
aged within the framework of GPV-2020 and three have been commissioned so far. 
OSK is also in the process of constructing non-strategic nuclear-powered Yasen-class 
submarines (project no. 885) and diesel-powered Lada-class submarines (project no. 
677). The surface vessel projects for the Russian Navy include the Steregushchiy-class 
corvettes built at the Severnaya Verf shipyard (project no. 20380) and designed by the 
Almaz design bureau. The second major project involves the construction of frigates 
(project no. 11356) at the Yantar shipyard. Admiral Grigorovich, the first vessel of 
the class, was delivered to the Russian Navy in 2016. In addition to large vessels, OSK 
shipyards have also built dozens of smaller ships of different types.90 
 
Economic indicators 
Unlike the other corporations reviewed in this study, OSK has not published any 
notes to its financial statements since 2015, which makes it difficult to analyse the 
overall picture. Annual reports can be used as a basis for informed assessments but 
not for detailed comparisons. It should be noted, however, that OSK is the only one 
of the corporations examined in this report that has at least published partial financial 
statements for the year 2017. For this reason, the economic indicators have been cal-
culated for the period 2014–2017. 
 
Like most other corporations examined in this study, OSK has also been characterised 
by poor profitability and substantial debts during the period in review. However, 
when measured on the basis of gearing and equity ratio in 2014 and 2015, its situation 
has been even weaker than average. Moreover, its liquidity in those years has probably 
also been weaker than in any of the other corporations reviewed in this study (current 
ratio 0.6 and 0.5). In 2015, balance sheet advance payments rose from RUB 167 to 
325 billion and in 2016, they reached RUB 502 billion. This pushed advance payments 
to nearly 60% of the balance sheet total, which is an extremely high figure (in 2017, 
they stood at about 55%). For comparison, the corresponding figure for OAK in 2015 
and 2016 was about 26%. Improvements in liquidity and solvency in 2016 and 2017 
are largely explained by generous advance payments. Moreover, in both years, the 
                                              
89 Объединённая Судостроительная Корпорация: Предприятия ОСК, [https://www.aoosk.ru/ 
companies/], referred to on 27 June 2019; Годовой отчет 2017, [https://www.aoosk.ru/about/disclosures/], 
referred to on 15 April 2019. 
90 Объединённая Судостроительная Корпорация (2017); Шеповаленко, Максим: Предварительные 
итоги ГПВ-2020 в части военного кораблестроения. Экспорт вооружений, Январь-Февраль 2018. 
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Russian government injected about RUB 16 billion into the corporation in the form 
of a share issue. It should be noted, however, that OSK reported an operating profit 
of 4.4% for 2017, which can be considered satisfactory in view of the extremely poor 
years preceding it. 
 
In an interesting detail, penalty payments and inventory write-downs entered under 
‘other operating costs’ for 2015 totalled about RUB 15 billion. Without these addi-
tional expenses, the operating profit would have been a reasonable 5.7%, instead of a 
paltry 0.3%. These costs are not detailed in the financial statements but it is a common 
practice that in project deliveries, such penalty payments are set out in contracts as 
sanctions for delays. The proportion of other expenses remained high in 2016 and 
2017 but as the notes to the financial statements are kept secret, no details of them 
are available. However, at general level, the fact that the company has incurred sub-
stantial ‘hassle costs’ raises questions about such matters as the quality of project man-
agement and the management of the subcontractor chain. 
 
When compared with the other sectors analysed in this study, shipbuilding is charac-
terised by small production runs and long delivery times. For example, in 2017 four 
new warships were completed, compared with eight in 2016. For civilian vessels, the 
figures were 11 and 14, respectively.91 This probably explains some of the substantial 
annual fluctuations in the cash flow from operations: in the period in review, this 
figure has been well below zero in some years (2014 and 2017), while in some years it 
has been well above zero (2015 and 2016). Concentration on the domestic market has 
been the second feature characterising OSK: in 2017, exports only accounted for 6% 
of the turnover (in 2016, the figure had been 12%). This business logic partially ex-
plains the substantial need for advance payments. 
 
With regard to capital expenditure, OSK seems to be on a healthy basis: except for 
one year, it has been at least 1.56 times higher than depreciation. At the same time, 
however, R&D investments have been zero and the R&D items capitalised in the 
balance sheet in 2014 and 2015 have also been negligible. The situation may, of 
course, have improved after 2015. 
 
As a whole, OSK has been a modest performer even though the trend would seem 
to be upwards. Shipbuilding has only accounted for between six and seven percent of 
Russia’s arms exports, which shows how completely the sector relies on domestic 
sales.92 This puts the shipyards in a difficult position, especially if they want to become 
less dependent on the state budget. 
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When orders and funding are considered, it should be remembered that shipbuilding 
was given a high priority in the allocation of funding within the framework of GPV-
2020: development of the Russian Navy originally accounted for about one quarter 
of the state armament programme. There has been strong criticism of the sector, and 
it has been levelled at such matters as inefficiency and outdated production machin-
ery. With the occupation of the Crimea and the sanctions imposed in the aftermath 
of the Ukrainian crisis, Russian shipyards found themselves in a ‘diesel crisis’ as the 
imports of many key components were stopped.93 In a shipyard accident in the Mur-
mansk region in autumn 2018, a floating dock (said to be Russia’s largest) sank during 
the overhaul of the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. The accident was caused by a 
technical failure.94 It is clear that one should not make conclusions of the entire sector 
on the basis of a single event. Nevertheless, the failure of such an important mainte-
nance system at a critical moment raises wider questions about the state of the overall 
service infrastructure. 
3.3 Rostec 
Structure and business operations 
Rostec is the multi-sector giant of Russia’s defence industry and over the years, a large 
number of companies and sectors have been incorporated into it. The corporation 
was established on the orders of President Putin on 23 November 2007, and its CEO 
Sergey Chemezov has become one of the most important figures in Russia’s defence 
industry and in the country’s industries in general. Chemezov and Putin have known 
each other since the 1970s when they both worked for the KGB in Dresden in what 
was then the German Democratic Republic. At the time, Chemezov was a Soviet 
intelligence officer tasked with spying on Western high technology secrets.95 In an 
interesting feature, Chemezov is the only one of the OPK’s chief executives that has 
a permanent seat in the VPK chaired by the President.96 
 
Rostec is perhaps the most visible example of the prevailing state-controlled industrial 
policy that has resulted in the creation of vertically integrated structures. In its early 
years, the corporation comprised more than 400 companies but by the end of 2017, 
the total had exceeded 700. However, because of its multi-sector structure and huge 
size, there is no point in examining Rostec as a single company. Rather, it is a cluster 
of companies producing a broad range of different products, from combat helicopters 
                                              
93 Шеповаленко, Максим: Предварительные итоги ГПВ-2020 в части военного кораблестроения. Экс-
порт вооружений, Январь-Февраль 2018, see also Juola et. al (2019), pp. 86–87. 
94 Лента.ру, 30 October 2018, Крупнейший в мире плавучий док затонул во время ремонта «Адмирала 
Кузнецова». [https://lenta.ru/news/2018/10/30/pd50], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
95 Myers, Steven L.: Uusi tsaari, Vladimir Putin ja hänen Venäjänsä, Bazar, 2018, p. 117. 
96 Президент России (2019). 
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to missiles, and from medical imaging devices to electrical vehicles. As shown in Fig-
ure 1 in Chapter 2 above, the corporation comprised four clusters and a number of 
separate holding companies at the end of 2017. 
 
The engine manufacturer ODK and the helicopter manufacturer Vertolety Rossii are 
two of the companies coming under the aviation cluster. The KRET group (in Rus-
sian Концерн радиоэлектронные технологии) manufacturing radio electronics is 
also an important Rostec subsidiary.97  
 
The cluster of companies manufacturing conventional weapons, ammunition and 
special chemical products includes Tehmash (ammunition), Kalashnikov (handguns), 
Vysokotochnye Kompleksy (high-precision weapons and missiles) and the Splav 
group (multiple launch rocket systems).98  
 
Roselektronika is by far the largest holding company in the radiotechnology and elec-
tronics cluster. The previously independent Objedinjonnaja pribostroitelnaja korpo-
tatsija (‘United equipment manufacturers’) was incorporated into Roselektronika in 
2017. Roselektronika’s products include communications and command systems, 
semiconductor technology, electronic warfare equipment and robotic systems. 
Shvabe is another major group in the cluster. It produces optoelectronic systems and 
lasers for both civilian and military purposes. The Avtomatika group is a specialist in 
cyber security and encrypted communications systems.99  
 
A number of companies have also been incorporated into Rostec as independent en-
tities, and the best-known of them is probably Uralvagonzavod, a manufacturer of 
main battle tanks and railway equipment. After running into serious economic diffi-
culties, this venerable company was merged into Rostec in 2016.100  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned companies, Rostec also comprises more than 20 
directly controlled strategic companies. These include Kamaz (lorry manufacturer), 
Rosoboronexport (state-owned weapons exporter), VSMPO-AVISMA (internation-
ally important titanium producer), Neftegazavtomatika (supplier of automation sys-
tems for liquefied-gas production plants), and even a combinate in Kaliningrad pro-
ducing amber.101  
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Case: Kalashnikov 
The name Kalashnikov is probably known to most people for the AK-47 assault rifle, 
perhaps the most famous handgun of the world. In 2016, with a market share of 54%, 
the company was the Russian market leader in civilian handguns, and the same year, 
it accounted for more than 90% of Russia’s handgun production. Kalashnikov ex-
ports its products to about 30 countries.102 . 
 
Kalashnikov is proud of its long and venerable traditions and the company can trace 
its history to 1809. That year, an arms factory was established in the town of Izhevsk 
on the orders of Tsar Alexander I. The production of the Kalashnikov assault rifles 
began in 1949.103 The Izhmash manufacturing company, established in 1975, re-
mained operational until 2011 when economic problems forced it into liquidation. A 
restructuring process followed and two years later, Rostec, which owned Izhmash, 
renamed the company Kalashnikov. In 2014, Rostec sold 49% of the new group to 
Transkomplektholding, a company owned by three private individuals, in which Ale-
ksey Krivoruchko was the largest shareholder (50%). It was reported in spring 2018, 
that Rostec had sold another 26% of its shares to the same investment company. 
Rostec retained a controlling interest in the company giving it veto power over im-
portant decisions. In Russia, this means 25% of the share capital plus one share.104 
 
In Rostec’s portfolio, Kalashnikov, with a workforce of less than 6,000, is a small 
player but there are a number of factors making it more important than its size would 
suggest. First of all, it has been presented by Russia’s political leadership as a model 
for cooperation between private investors and the state in defence industry matters. 
Within a few years, Kalashnikov was transformed from a loss-making crisis company 
into a success story, and it is cited as an example of the results achieved through a 
government-led industrial policy.105 It has diversified its production by acquiring new 
businesses, and in this way it has systematically put into practice the diversification 
strategy promoted by Russia’s leaders. In addition to handguns, Kalashnikov also 
manufactures unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), small assault boats, and weapons sys-
tem modules for vehicle platforms. 
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Secondly, in spring 2018, Aleksey Krivoruchko, the company’s Managing Director, 
was appointed Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister with responsibility for armament 
and arms industry. In the same connection, he also had to give up his ownership in 
Kalashnikov. As part of the reshuffle, Dmitry Rogozin, the long-serving Deputy 
Prime Minister was replaced by Yury Borisov and was appointed as the CEO of the 
Roscosmos corporation. In some Western comments, these moves were seen as 
strengthening the already strong position of Sergey Chemezov, Rostec’s CEO.106 
 
In terms of his expertise and experience, Krivoruchko can be considered as a stranger 
in the Ministry of Defence as he has a background as a businessman.107 Between 1999 
and 2006, he worked in the civilian aircraft industry and as the technical director of 
the Aeroflot airline. From 2006 to 2009, he worked in similar tasks in the AvtoVAZ 
vehicle-manufacturing company, and in 2010 he was appointed as the Managing Di-
rector of Aeroexpress, the operator of airport rail link services in the Moscow area. 
Finally, in 2014, he became the largest private shareholder in Kalashnikov and the 
company’s Managing Director and from this task, he moved to his present post in the 
Ministry of Defence.108 
 
His appointment to a high ministerial post may be a sign of a power play but also a 
modest indication that the Ministry of Defence wants to acquire new expertise and 
understanding of the way in which businesses operate. It remains to be seen how he 
will succeed in this task. 
 
Economic indicators 
The key economic indicators published by Rostec and collected from the company’s 
report on operations are shown in Table 7. It should be noted that Rostec has selected 
the figures that it wants to present to investors, decision-makers and the public at 
large and for this reason, it is difficult to make any far-reaching conclusions on their 
basis. Moreover, it has not been stated which standards have been used in the calcu-
lation of the figures, which means that direct comparisons with other companies can-
not be made. Interestingly enough, at least some of the figures for subsidiaries are 
substantially higher that what the subsidiaries themselves have reported in their own 
IFRS-based financial statements. For example, the engine manufacturing company 
ODK posted a turnover of RUB 190 billion and 177 billion for 2016 and 2015, re-
spectively. The figures given by Rostec are RUB 223 billion and 212 billion, respec-
tively. The difference may be explained by the differences between RAS and IFRS. 
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Table 7. Economic indicators taken from Rostec’s annual reports.109  
 2017 2016 2015 
Turnover (RUB million) 1,589 1,266 1,140 
Change in turnover from 
previous year (%) 
25.5 11.1  
EBITDA (RUB million) 305 268 253 
EBITDA margin (%) 19.2 21.17 22.19 
Profit for the period 
(RUB million) 
121 88 99 
Profit for the period (%) 7.6 7.0 8.7 
 
In addition to the figures shown in the table, Rostec has reported that in 2008 (the 
year the corporation was established), a total of 148 of its more than 400 companies 
were crisis companies, 28 were in liquidation, 17 did not have any business operations 
and the corporation posted a combined loss of RUB 64 billion. Between 2010 and 
2017, the average salary in the corporation rose from about RUB 20,000 to about 
RUB 47,000, an increase of about 135%. During the same period, the inflation rate in 
Russia was ‘only’ about 77%. This means that both in real and relative terms, there 
has been a substantial rise in wages and salaries at Rostec over the past ten years. 
 
Concerning the turnover, it should be remembered that companies have been con-
tinuously incorporated into Rostec, which means that one cannot talk of organic 
growth (growth based on corporate acquisitions). There is no doubt that an operating 
margin exceeding 20% is high but when taken out of context, this indicator is sensitive 
to manipulation. When at the same time, the EBIT figure has not been published, the 
suspicion arises that Rostec wants to hide its problems (such as a high debt to equity 
ratio) by giving an excessively positive picture of itself. On the other hand, the profit 
of 7.6% for the 2017 financial year should be considered as reasonable,110 and suggests 
that the corporation also has genuinely profitable subsidiaries. As no financial state-
ments are available, it is unfortunately impossible to reliably estimate the accuracy of 
the figures or what lies behind them. 
 
The above figures give at least a rough idea of the corporation’s finances, irrespective 
of whether or not they are deemed as accurate. Thus, it seems that Rostec has man-
aged to considerably strengthen its financial position. At the same time, this is not 
particularly surprising given the massive armament programme of the 2010s. It has 
been claimed that as the largest operator in the sector, Rostec has secured up to one 
quarter of the contracts allocated within the framework of the yearly state defence 
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order.111 It is clear that a funding injection of such size is also reflected in the corpo-
ration’s profits. 
3.3.1 Vertolety Rossii 
Structure and business operations 
Vertolety Rossi is one of the world’s largest helicopter manufacturers. According to 
some reports, it controls 10% of the global helicopter markets, which makes it the 
world’s fourth largest supplier of rotor-winged aircraft.112 The corporation was estab-
lished in 2007 and it designs, produces and maintains civilian and military helicopters. 
Its main production plants are located in Rostov-on-Don (Rostvertol), Kazan, Ulan-
Ude and Arsenyev. The corporation’s most important design bureaus still carry the 
names of their founders (Nikolai Kamov and Mikhail Mil) and the best-known heli-
copter ranges (Ka and Mi) are also named after the two.113 The corporation has also 
entered into a joint venture (Helivert) with the Italian company Leonardo. Established 
in 2009, it is responsible for the final assembly and marketing of the medium-sized 
AW139 helicopter in Russia.114 
 
Economic indicators 
Vertolety Rossii is the only one of the corporations reviewed in this study that has 
posted at least satisfactory figures when examined on the basis of the indicators used 
in this report. In fact, in terms of profitability, its performance is excellent. The aver-
age return on capital employed between 2013 and 2016 was an impressive 18%. In 
terms of the debt ratio, the corporation is also in a class of its own: at most, its net 
financing expenses were 17% of the operating margin, which is much less than in 
most other corporations examined in this study. In gearing and equity ratio, the cor-
poration’s performance was between satisfactory and good, which is also an excellent 
achievement when compared with the other corporations.115 
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An estimated total of 685 helicopters were delivered within the framework of GPV-
2020 between 2011 and 2016.116 The assumption is that they were all supplied by 
Vertolety Rossii. Annual deliveries have varied between 100 and 120.117 
 
Sales of new helicopters accounted for about 77% of the corporation’s turnover in 
2016, and the remainder came from maintenance services. In 2015, the figures had 
been about 80% and 17%, respectively. It is interesting to note that Vertolety Rossii 
is also a major exporter: in 2016, the domestic market accounted for 35% of the sales, 
which means that it came second after exports. Africa was the largest single market, 
accounting for 40% of the sales. It was followed by Asia (about 19%). In 2015, the 
breakdown had been as follows: Russia 29%, Asia 34% and Africa 24%.118  
 
In capital expenditure and especially in R&D, the corporation has also performed 
significantly better than the other companies reviewed in this study. In the peak years, 
it has invested almost two per cent of its turnover in research and development. This 
has been mainly due to profitable business operations, in which global exports also 
play an important role. A company with solid finances can also invest in the future. 
At the same time, Vertolety Rossii has also received state aid. When the intangible 
balance sheet assets are examined, it can be noted that capitalised development ex-
penditure totalled about RUB 25.3 billion between 2013 and 2016, while state aid 
amounted to about RUB 8.1 billion during the same period. The corporation would, 
however, also manage quite well without such aid. 
 
All in all, Vertolety Rossii can be considered as the strongest of the corporations re-
viewed in this study and it also provides Russia with much needed export revenue.  
3.3.2 Kalashnikov 
The history of Kalashnikov, including name changes and corporate restructurings, 
was discussed above. Izhmash, its predecessor, had reached a crisis point in the year 
when it went into liquidation: its output fell by almost 50% and it posted a loss of 
RUB 2.43 billion.119 
 
The sanctions imposed by the West in summer 2014 hit Kalashnikov hard because 
the United States accounted for about 40% of its total sales, making it the second-
largest market after Russia. The company responded to the crisis by taking a range of 
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efficiency-boosting measures, by acquiring new businesses and by improving its ser-
vice culture. In addition to arms, Kalashnikov also started to sell and lease its brand 
and to build a consumer-driven service network.120  
 
Judging from economic indicators, the efforts have produced results and the company 
was able to improve its performance in the period 2014–2016. After suffering a heavy 
operating loss of RUB 3.5 billion, the company was able to post a profit of more than 
RUB 3 billion, and the losses of about RUB 200 million for the financial year were 
followed by a profit of RUB 2.3 billion. In a lucky coincidence, the company seems 
to have benefited from a weak rouble during the two most difficult years because in 
2015 and 2016, its financial performance improved by about RUB 2.3 and 3.4 billion, 
respectively, as a result of exchange rate differences. This was possible because most 
of the company’s expenses are in roubles.121 
 
Because of the losses accumulated during 2014, the company’s equity went about 
RUB 500 million into the red, pushing the equity ratio to -12.6%, an alarming figure. 
By the end of 2016, the company had managed to boost its equity by nearly four 
billion roubles. Advance payments totalling more than six billion roubles also seem 
to have played an important role in the company’s struggle for survival. It was prob-
ably the advance payments that allowed Kalashnikov to launch a sizeable capital ex-
penditure programme, in which it spent about RUB 1.4 billion on fixed assets in 2015 
and about RUB 3.5 billion in 2016. The company also took out new loans totalling 
nearly six billion roubles from such institutions as Sberbank.122  
 
Even though the company was able to recover from its losses and post a profit in 
2016, the operating cash flow still showed a minus of about RUB 570 million. How-
ever, this is mainly explained by a transfer of substantial advance payments (nearly 
RUB 7 billion) to the company’s account. When measured on the basis of gearing and 
equity ratio, Kalashnikov is still burdened with substantial debts but it seems to be 
going in the right direction.123 
 
The company has not posted any research or development expenditure, while at the 
same time, the R&D item entered in intangible balance sheet assets totalled nearly 
RUB 25 million in 2016. It should be noted, however, that this is only a fraction of 
the total intangible assets of about RUB 1.3 billion.124 
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As a whole, it would thus seem that Kalashnikov has got through the worst part of 
the crisis and is now slowly recovering. It is too early to tell whether the corporation 
is now on a sustainable growth path but the measures already introduced are probably 
taking it in the right direction. Government support and a professional approach to 
management have pulled the company out of its economic tailspin, and Kalashnikov 
is now able to develop its operations by making investments, by diversifying its pro-
duction and by revising its business models. 
 
Can this potential recipe for success be copied by other parts of OPK? This is what 
many decision-makers seem to hope and believe. Everything is possible, but it is easier 
said than done. First of all, Kalashnikov has been able to rely on a clearly defined and 
well-recognised product category with a large number of users (handguns), which can 
be marketed globally for both civilian and military purposes. Combined with an ex-
tremely well-known brand, this has probably allowed Kalashnikov to develop its busi-
ness operations in a more flexible manner compared with most other Russian defence 
industry companies. Secondly, Kalashnikov is relatively small, which means that it has 
been easy for the Russian government to inject capital into the company or to lend 
money to it during crisis periods. This is probably also the reason why the company 
has been able to attract domestic private investors as owners. It might have been 
difficult for substantially larger companies to obtain the necessary funding. Thirdly, 
development and change management is also easier in a small company than in a giant 
conglomerate. 
3.3.3 ODK 
Structure and business operations 
The engine-manufacturing corporation ODK develops, builds and maintains engines 
and associated systems and components for aviation, shipping, space and energy in-
dustry. It supplies products for both civilian and military use. ODK’s products include 
engines and propulsion systems for aeroplanes, helicopters, ships and launch vehicles, 
and gas turbine units for the generation of electricity and thermal energy. OAK, Ver-
tolety Rossii, Rosatom, Roscosmos and Gazprom are among the corporation’s major 
domestic customers. The Ufa Engine Industrial Association UMPO (in Russian 
Уфимское моторостроительное производственное объединение) located in the 
city of Ufa is ODK’s largest subsidiary. 125 
 
Important military development projects in recent years have included the engines for 
the SU-57 fighter aircraft and the TV7-117 product family. The latter is a range of 
turboprop engines intended for light transport planes and helicopters. The PD-14 
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turbofan designed for the MS-21 aircraft and the Sam146 engine produced by the 
Franco-Russian joint venture PowerJet are examples of the corporation’s civilian pro-
jects. In PowerJet, ODK has partnered with the French multi-sector group Safran, 
and the engine in question is intended for the Sukhoi SSJ-100 airliner.126 
 
Economic indicators 
In the light of the 2014 figures, ODK could, like many other OPK companies, be 
characterised as a loss-making and heavily indebted crisis company. However, the 
company was able to substantially boost its operating efficiency in 2015 and its oper-
ating profit rose to almost 20%. Compared with the figure of 2.3% for 2014, this was 
a substantial improvement. Significant improvements in productivity were achieved: 
during the two-year period, turnover went up by about a quarter, while production 
costs only grew by slightly more than three per cent. The domestic market accounted 
for about 70% of the turnover in 2016. China was the most important export market, 
accounting for 17.5% of the sales. In 2015, the figures had been 65% and 18%, re-
spectively. India accounted for about 11% of the corporation’s sales. In an interesting 
feature, Rostec-internal sales accounted for about 58% of the sales in 2016, while in 
2015, the figure had been about 44%.127 
 
ODK also publishes the figures for its most important subsidiaries, and according to 
this information, UMPO accounted for about 38% of the corporation’s turnover in 
2016 but for two-thirds of the operating profit and for more than 90% of the profits 
for the year. The performance figures for 2015 were similar, and thus there is every 
reason to call UMPO the most productive and efficient part of the corporation. 
 
Financing expenses played an important role in the corporation’s expense structure 
and accounted for about 29% of the operating margin in 2016 and for as much as 
43% in 2014. Substantial financing expenses also arouse from exchange rate differ-
ences, which probably resulted from the operations of the subsidiaries in France and 
the Netherlands. 
 
ODK’s equity ratio has been extremely low and it was only turned positive in 2016, 
partially with the help of an additional investment of about RUB 19 billion by the 
parent company Rostec. The extremely low equity ratio also explains the artificially 
high return on capital employed in 2015 (20%). Because of a negative equity ratio, 
gearing was also negative in 2014 and 2015. 
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It is noteworthy that despite its financial problems, the corporation has continuously 
modernised its production equipment, which is a prerequisite for continuing and de-
veloping operations in the long term. The corporation has also engaged in research 
and development work, which has been in modest scale but nevertheless more exten-
sive than the R&D carried out by the other companies examined in this study. It 
should be remembered, however, that the capital expenditure and the R&D have been 
funded with direct or indirect state subsidies, which means that lessening dependency 
on government orders will also be a problem in the future. 
3.3.4 Uralvagonzavod 
Structure and business operations 
Uralvagonzavod started as a manufacturer of railway carriages in the city of Nizhny 
Tagil in the Sverdlovsk region in 1936. The company still produces railway vehicles 
but internationally it is best known for main battle tanks and other armoured vehicles. 
In addition to railway carriages, Uralvagonzavod also produces other vehicles for ci-
vilian use, such as lorries, trams and excavators. The corporation comprises more than 
40 design bureaus, production plants and research organisations. The T-34 and T-55 
tanks have been among the best-known products of Uralvagonzavod over the dec-
ades. The new Armata product family has been one of the most visible development 
projects of the corporation in recent years, and of its members, at least the prototypes 
of the T-14 main battle tank and the T-15 infantry fighting vehicle have been shown 
in public. Moreover, several existing models, such as T-72 and T-90 have been up-
graded in the 2010s within the framework of the state armament programme.128 
 
Economic indicators 
Uralvagonzavod is a clear underperformer among the corporations examined in this 
study and, unlike the other companies, it failed to make improvements in any of the 
sectors discussed in this report during the period in review. It accumulated losses and 
substantial debts throughout the period 2013–2016, and military materiel accounted 
for about 71% of its turnover in 2016 (compared with 66% in 2015). Exports ac-
counted for 53% (36% in 2015) of this total and the remaining 47% was generated by 
domestic sales. The supply of about 1,000 modernised T-72 main battle tanks between 
2012 and 2016 has been by far the largest delivery made by Uralvagonzavod within 
the framework of GPV-2020.129 
 
The company is saddled with huge debts, as clearly shown by a gearing of about 400% 
and an equity ratio of less than 15% in 2016. In 2016, financing expenses accounted 
                                              
128 Presentation of Uralvagonzavod, [http://uralvagonzavod.ru/company], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
129 Экспорт вооружений 2016, 2017. 
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for 55% of the operating margin; a year before, the figure had stood at 142%.  
 
It has been reported that the corporation was plunged into a crisis in 2012 as the 
demand for new railway carriages collapsed. According to Uralvagonzavod itself, its 
logistics-sector customers decided to extend the useful lives of their rolling stock by 
several years, which led to a rapid fall in sales. In addition, weakening of the rouble’s 
exchange rate and rise in interest rates substantially weakened the company’s financ-
ing position.130 Indeed, based on the financial statements, financing expenses in 2014 
and 2015 were about RUB 12-13 billion higher than in 2013, which was enough to 
push the corporation well into the red in the financial year. 
 
In 2016, the Russian Ministry of Economic Affairs prohibited transport operators 
from using outdated rolling stock, and as a result, Uralvagonzavod started receiving 
new orders again. This was, however, too late to secure the company’s independence 
because the then Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin had already turned to President 
Putin, proposing that the corporation should be transferred under Rostec so that its 
economic problems could be sorted out. This was also done and the following year, 
UVZ was incorporated into Rostec and it became one of its many subsidiaries. Ural-
vagonzavod was also one of the companies that concluded an agreement with the 
Russian government in December 2016, under which the state agreed to repay some 
of its debts.131 
 
According to a number of analysts, the problems concerning the railway equipment 
were the main factor causing the near collapse of Uralvagonzavod. After it had been 
acquired by Rostec, the company’s management was replaced and the loss-making 
logistics subsidiary was sold as part of efficiency-improvement measures. At the same 
time, deliveries made within the framework of the state defence order have been prof-
itable throughout the period in review even though the profit margin has been low 
(between 0.5 and 2%). The whole corporation is expected to become profitable dur-
ing 2018.132 According to Rostec’s annual report, Uralvagonzavod still posted a loss 
of RUB 3.4 billion in 2017, which would nevertheless be substantially less than the 
loss of RUB 5.3 billion for 2016. However, the calculating principles used by Rostec 
were not known at the time of the writing of this report, and thus the figure cannot 
be considered entirely reliable. 
 
 
 
                                              
130 Ведомости, 6 March 2018. Как «Уралвагонзавод» оказался на грани банкротства и что его спасло. 
[https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2018/03/06/752833-uralvagonzavod], referred to on 15 April 
2019. 
131 ibid. 
132 ibid. 
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All in all, according to the financial statements available, Uralvagonzavod has been in 
extremely poor financial shape for most of the 2010s and there has been no turn for 
the better. At the same time, however, repayment of the debts connected with the 
state defence orders has probably provided the corporation with substantial leeway 
and a chance to make a fresh start (at least in part). It is noteworthy that despite the 
crisis, the corporation has continued to modernise its production facilities, which is a 
prerequisite for future growth. It has been reported that under Rostec, Uralvagonza-
vod has also been able to enhance the profitability and operating prerequisites of its 
civilian production. It is clear that the corporation is such an important arms supplier 
that it will be kept operational, regardless of its profitability. 
3.4 Summary of the companies’ financial situation 
In overall terms, the financial situation of the companies reviewed in this study can 
be characterised as weak but steady. The low point following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union has probably been reached and the industry has been pulled out of the 
tailspin accompanying the collapse. When compared with the extremely poor starting 
point ten years ago, the situation can be characterised as at least reasonable. Firstly, 
the profitability of most of the corporations is still weak or no more than fair but the 
trend would seem to be gradually upwards. Secondly, in terms of solvency, most of 
the companies have been able to reduce their debts to more tolerable levels, even 
though nearly all of them are still heavily indebted. In this connection, it should be 
remembered that the elimination of debts totalling about RUB 800 billion by the gov-
ernment in December 2016 is not yet shown in 2016 figures. It should be noted, 
however, that the combined total of the interest-bearing debts accumulated by the six 
companies concerned stood at about RUB 1,000 billion at the end of 2016, and thus 
the debt burden of the sector has been substantially higher than the assistance pro-
vided by the state. It is clear, however, that the debt relief of RUB 800 billion has 
helped many corporations to substantially reduce their debt servicing costs. For ex-
ample, halving the financing expenses of OAK would have transformed a loss of 
RUB 4.5 billion into a profit of about RUB 10 billion in 2016. Likewise, instead of 
posting a loss of RUB 5.3 billion, Uralvagonzavod would have shown a profit of two 
billion roubles. Thirdly, liquidity in all corporations is at a level that can be deemed 
adequate, considering the operating environment. The Russian government can be 
assumed to bail out the corporations in any liquidity crisis, and for this reason, they 
are probably prepared to operate with slightly lower liquidity that would be possible 
for purely market-based operators. 
 
In a clearly positive signal, the rate of capital expenditure is high and in many of the 
companies, it has substantially exceeded depreciation. Admittedly, most of the capital 
expenditure is debt-driven and based on government money but modernisation of 
the production machinery is also a prerequisite for profitable business operations and 
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provides a basis for future growth. This is particularly important for defence industry 
companies against the background of a weak starting point in the early 2010s. 
 
Relatively low inputs into research and development can be considered a negative 
factor in view of the future. Only two of the corporations reviewed in the study (Ver-
tolety Rossii and ODK) have been able to invest more than one per cent of their 
turnover in R&D. For others, the figure is zero or only slightly above it. For example, 
in Airbus and Saab, the corresponding figure for 2015 and 2016 varied between 4.5 
and 5.5%, while in Patria and Insta, two Finnish companies, R&D to turnover ratio 
in 2017 was 2.0 and 3.6%, respectively.133 
 
Subsidies channelled through federation-level development programmes provide the 
companies with some leeway but at annual level, this funding is unlikely to give the 
recipients any significant competitive edge. An exception to this is the aircraft indus-
try, for which a total of almost RUB 80 billion has been allocated within the frame-
work of the current programme. This is ten per cent of the combined turnover of 
OAK, Vertolety Rossii and ODK. This can be considered as a substantial injection. 
 
Interestingly enough, most of the OPK companies have, however, generated income 
through sales of research and development services. A large part of this funding has 
probably come from the armament programme GPV-2020. Such an operating model 
may well work when military equipment is developed, especially if budget funding can 
be guaranteed for several years at a time. At the same time, however, it is questionable 
whether such a model can provide a basis for developing new and innovative products 
that would attract orders in civilian and export markets. Typically, product develop-
ment directly ordered and paid for by the customer and taking place within the frame-
work of a project is based on the customer’s requirements, which can be highly spe-
cific. This does not necessarily encourage manufacturers to engage in independent 
development work or to seek new customers or markets but to adhere to existing 
customer relationships and products. 
 
There is one company standing out in the group. According to all indicators, Vertolety 
Rossii achieves at least satisfactory levels, while its profitability is excellent. It is the 
only one of the reviewed companies for which exports generate more revenue than 
domestic sales and which would probably manage on its own, even in the short term.  
Strong export performance is probably the main factor behind the solid finances and 
the higher-than-average R&D inputs.  
 
                                              
133 Tekniikka & Talous, 4 June 2018. T&T selvitti suurimmat t&k-yritykset: tässä 100 suurimman lista. 
[https://www.tekniikkatalous.fi/talous_uutiset/t-t-selvitti-suurimmat-t-k-yritykset-tassa-100-suurimman-lista-
6727849], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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How do Russian companies compare with Western counterparts? Economic indica-
tors of the pan-European Airbus consortium and the Swedish Saab group are shown 
in Appendix 1.134,135 Three things stand out in the comparisons. Firstly, the two West-
ern companies have a significantly higher turnover-to-employee ratio than the Russian 
corporations. For example, at Saab, turnover per employee (conversion factor 10) 
amounted to about EUR 180,000 in 2016, while at OAK, the figure was about EUR 
66,000 (conversion factor 65). Moreover, unlike OAK, Airbus is a global player in its 
sector. Secondly, Airbus and Saab spend many times more on R&D than the OPK 
corporations examined in this study. Thirdly, it should be noted that in terms of prof-
itability, the Western companies are not cash cows for their owners either. Admittedly, 
this is fairly typical of a mature and capital-intensive industrial sector characterised by 
projects of long duration. As a whole, the differences between the Russian and West-
ern companies referred to above can be summed up by saying that the Western com-
panies are profitable and financially healthy, and have a sound operating basis. The 
Russian companies on the other hand are only recovering from the depths of a finan-
cial-technological crisis and need strong government support so that they can get on 
their own feet. They have started from way behind, which means that they have more 
potential to enhance productivity by using existing manufacturing technologies than 
Western companies. It remains to be seen whether they are able to do this in the long 
term. 
 
                                              
134 Airbus: Financial Statement 2015–2016, [https://www.airbus.com/ 
investors/financial-results-and-annual-reports.html], referred to on 15 April 2019 
135 Saab Group: Financial Statements 2015-2016, [https://saabgroup.com/investor-relations/reports/],referred 
to on 15 April 2019 
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4 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Findings 
espite the many problems it is facing, Russia’s defence industry is now in a 
significantly better shape than at the start of the 2010s. With the funding 
provided under the state armament programme 2020, the industry is now 
recovering from the low point following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and 
it has been able to upgrade its manufacturing processes, and restart serial production, 
especially in the field of modernised weapons systems. The industry has been able 
supply products for both domestic and export markets, which may not have been 
possible ten years ago because of limited production capacity. Modern weaponry now 
accounts for a substantially higher proportion of the armed forces equipment than in 
the past and Russia may achieve the government-set target under which 70% of the 
materiel should be up to the latest standards by the year 2020. Between 15 and 20% 
of the state defence order has been channelled to R&D work each year, which has 
definitely provided a substantial boost for the development of weapons technology. 
As a whole, Russia has substantially enhanced its military-industrial production capac-
ity over the past ten years. 
 
At the same time, however, strengthening of the production capacity has not been 
reflected in the companies’ financial position as many of the companies still seem to 
have problems, especially with profitability and solvency. In most of the corporations 
analysed in this report, losses accumulated over the years have eaten away a substantial 
proportion of their equity. The companies have invested between zero and less than 
two per cent of their turnover in product development, which is an extremely low 
figure for a high-technology sector. The support funding channelled through federa-
tion-level development programmes provide the companies with some additional lee-
way and room for capital expenditure but at annual level, the funding is probably 
inadequate to give them a decisive competitive edge (except for the aircraft industry). 
The government decision at the end of 2016 to repay debts totalling RUB 800 billion 
has eased the situation in the sector by substantially reducing the companies’ financing 
expenses. However, it will not solve the problems arising from poor operational prof-
itability and low productivity. 
 
The sector is highly dependent on state budget appropriations and the number of 
private investors is small. In a telling example, when Deputy Defence Minister Yury 
D 
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Borisov suggested in early 2018 that OPK companies should raise funds in private 
markets through share issues, heads of important defence-industry corporations re-
jected the idea, citing economic and security concerns.136 Many of the institutional 
problems, such as corruption and intellectual property rights, remain unsolved. The 
expectations that Russian defence industry companies would become profitable 
global actors attracting investors have not materialised. 137. 
 
The goal of substantially increasing commercially successful civilian production set by 
the Russian government seems to be much more difficult to achieve than producing 
new military equipment. Moreover, wider foreign policy developments such as the 
sanctions imposed by the West, Russia’s gradual isolation from the West and the state-
directed attempts to achieve self-sufficiency by substituting imports with domestic 
production are in conflict with the diversification strategy and the efforts to reduce 
dependency on state budgets. 
 
That said, there may well be success stories within OPK in the coming years. Vertolety 
Rossii shows that this can be achieved. Substantial support channelled to the aircraft 
industry, combined with extensive development inputs may well produce results in 
the long term. When correctly implemented, the new pricing system for military ma-
teriel may provide a basis for substantial productivity improvements. International 
joint ventures with such partners as China can help Russian companies to find new 
sources of funding and investments independent of the West. These signs and devel-
opments should be closely monitored in the coming years.  
4.2 Limitations on the study and topics for further research 
Relying on a relatively small number of financial statements, most of which are by 
aircraft manufacturers and shipbuilders, has been the key limitation faced by the au-
thors. For example, because of inadequate source material, they have not been able 
to analyse companies in electrical, electronics or information technology industries. 
Secondly, the authors have focused on the highest tiers of the large state-owned in-
dustrial corporations, which may have hidden the potentially substantial differences 
between their subsidiaries. Thirdly, the analysis mainly concerns economic indicators 
contained in the financial statements without connecting this information with order 
backlogs and production data in detail. I.e. the financial figures are only related to the 
production data at macro level. This approach weakens the value of historical financial 
statements data as forecasts. 
                                              
136 Коммерсантъ, 2 August 2018, Предприятия ОПК дистанцировались от биржи. [https://www.kommer-
sant.ru/doc/3702838], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
137 РИА Новости, 18 April 2017, Не время праздновать: Рогозин раскритиковал ход реформы ОПК. 
[https://ria.ru/20170418/1492483303.html], referred to on 15 April 2019. 
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Reviewing the financial statements and reports on operations prepared in accordance 
with the Russian RAS standards would be a logical follow-up to this study. This would 
allow the examination of more companies, and provide a basis for a more compre-
hensive and in-depth analysis of their operations both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
in the form of an operational review. It could also provide a basis for a more detailed 
examination of individual subsidiaries of large defence industry corporations. More-
over, researchers could analyse in more detail what lies behind economic indicators, 
for example by examining trends in value added or cost structures. 
 
Secondly, the economic analysis could be supplemented with other indicators, such 
as personnel structures or wage trends, and by comparing them with the situation in 
other sectors. This could provide a more detailed and analytical picture of the devel-
opments in the sector at macro and micro level. 
 
Thirdly, the financial analysis of the sector could be more closely connected with do-
mestic-policy and foreign-policy developments. For example: what is the role played 
by defence industry sector in social, labour and regional policy? What type of funding 
has been provided by international partners for such purposes as projects and indus-
trial development? 
 
The authors hope that the findings and conclusions presented in this report would 
encourage further research on the topic. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Economic indicators of the companies 
Table 8. Economic indicators of the Russian companies reviewed in the study - profitability, solvency and liquidity  
Name 
 
Products, owner-
ship  
Head office Year 
Turnover 
(RUB mil-
lion) 
Number of 
employees 
 EBIT 
(RUB 
million) 
EBIT-
% 
Profit/loss 
for the pe-
riod (RUB 
million) 
ROCE 
(%) 
Gearing (%) 
Equity ra-
tio (%) 
Current 
ratio 
ОАК Aircraft  Moscow 2017 451,800 102,000 21,600 4.8           
OAK State   2016 416,926 96,787 11,203 2.7 -4,481 4.3 175.2 15.7 1.3 
      2015 346,120 96,545 -69,412 -20.1 -109,946 -14.2 123.1 19.7 1.4 
      2014 294,538 98,800 4,212 1.4 -13,654 2.0 203.3 17.7 1.3 
      2013 220,065 93,950 1,135 0.5 -13,508 1.0 204.3 19.1 1.4 
ОСК Ships St Petersburg 2017 325,708 94,964 14,419 4.4 5,914 7.4 30.8 28.1 1.1 
OSK State   2016 301,946 91,878 4,241 1.4 3,214 6.6 -12.4 26.0 1.0 
      2015 279,226 88,237 840 0.3 5,373 4.3 394.1 12.2 0.5 
      2014 237,223 81,411 494 0.2 4,656 1.5 588.5 8.0 0.6 
Вертолёты России Helicopters Moscow 2016 214,360 43,495 32,395 15.1 16,431 12.7 68.6 36.8 1.0 
Vertolety Rossii Rostec   2015 219,972 41,800 58,594 26.6 41,965 23.4 85.6 36.9 1.0 
      2014 169,842 42,000 39,404 23.2 21,108 21.9 140.4 30.7 0.9 
      2013 138,263  20,614 14.9 9,390 14.9 196.9 24.7 0.8 
ОДК Engines Moscow 2016 189,578 91,856 31,865 16.8 19,001 21.3 722.1 8.6 1.2 
ODK Rostec   2015 177,469 88,500 34,628 19.5 6,985 25.7 -1402.9 -6.8 0.8 
      2014 140,947 80,000 3,178 2.3 -30,690 5.6 -330.8 -35.8 0.7 
Уралвагонзавод 
Main battle tanks, 
railway carriages 
Nizhny Tagil 
2016 132,339 29,580 5,441 4.1 -5,306 -1.4 396.4 14.0 0.9 
Uralvagonzavod 2015 92,896 30,284 1,114 1.2 -16,441 -5.7 462.3 15.9 0.8 
  Rostec   2014 127,516 30,954 9,688 7.6 -5,293 -4.0 302.5 21.7 1.0 
      2013 74,632   -1,028 -1.4 -7,036 -5.9 163.8 33.3 0.9 
Калашников 
Handguns, UAVs, 
assault boats 
Izhevsk 2016 18,342 5,930 3,271 17.8 2,346 24.8 177.0 25.7 0.9 
Kalashnikov   2015 8,474 5,128 504 5.9 2,050 9.5 78.5 26.9 0.7 
 Rostec  2014 2,948 4,960 -3,542 -120.1 -200 -192.3 -288.3 -12.6 0.6 
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Table 9. Economic indicators of the Russian companies reviewed in the study - capital expenditure and research and development expenditure 
Name 
(in Russian and in 
transliterated 
form) 
Year 
Capital ex-
penditure 
(RUB mil-
lion) 
Capital ex-
pendi-
ture/depre-
ciation (%) 
R&D ex-
penditure 
(RUB mil-
lion) 
R&D expendi-
ture (% of 
turnover) 
OAK 2016 45,864 219 958 0.23 
OAK  2015 30,701 67 542 0.16 
  2014 38,999 179 651 0.22 
  2013 34,832 217 370 0.17 
ОСК 2017 14,533 207 0 0 
OSK 2016 7,497 99 0 0 
  2015 12,572 185 0 0 
  2014 12,218 15 0 0 
Вертолёты России 2016 17,511 114 4,025 1.88 
Vertolety Rossii 2015 19,358 200 1,407 0.64 
  2014 20,582 195 2,396 1.41 
  2013 16,547 251 1,609 1.16 
ОДК 2016 17,733 499 2,917 1.54 
ODK 2015 15,824 522 1,122 0.63 
  2014 15,474 297 1,226 0.87 
Уралвагонзавод 2016 12,271 106 0 0 
Uralvagonzavod 2015 25,931 458 0 0 
  2014 62,174 637 0 0 
  2013 38,303 373 0 0 
Калашников 2016 4,490 499 0 0 
Kalashnikov 2015 1,655 522 0 0 
  2014 561 297 0 0 
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Table 10. Economic indicators of Airbus and Saab - profitability, solvency and liquidity 
Name 
Sector and 
ownership 
Head office Year 
Turnover 
(EUR/SEK 
million) 
Number of 
employees 
EBIT 
(EUR/SEK mil-
lion) 
EBIT-% 
Profit/loss for 
the period 
(EUR/SEK mil-
lion) 
 ROCE 
(%) 
Gearing (%) 
Equity ra-
tio (%) 
Current 
ratio 
Airbus 
Aviation and 
space tech-
nology  Leiden 
2016 66,581 133,782 2,258 3.4 1,000 3.4 1232.0 5.1 0.9 
     
2015 64,450 136,574 4,062 6.3 2,698 5.3 741.0 8.8 0.9 
Saab Multi-sector Stockholm 2016 28,631 15,466 1,797 6.3 1,175 5.7 139.0 36.9 1.5 
      2015 27,186 14,685 1,900 7.0 1,402 6.5 138.5 37.9 1.6 
 
Table 11. Economic indicators of Airbus and Saab - capital expenditure and research and development expenditure 
Name Year 
Capital ex-
penditure 
(EUR/SEK 
million) 
Capital ex-
pendi-
ture/depre-
ciation (%) 
R&D ex-
penditure 
(EUR/SEK 
million) 
R&D ex-
penditure (% 
of turnover) 
Airbus 2016 3,180 138.6 2,970 4.46 
  2015 3,002 121.7 3,460 5.37 
Saab 2016 1,689 181.2 1,592 5.56 
  2015 1,393 138.2 1,565 5.76 
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Appendix 2. Calculation formulas used  
 
 
1) Return on capital employed (ROCE) measures the relative profitability of the 
company. In practice, interest-free debts comprise advance payments received 
and accounts payable. 
ROCE =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 +  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
=
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 −  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑠
 
 
2) Gearing describes the ratio of the company’s interest-bearing net liabilities to 
equity. 
𝐺𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 =
𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 −  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 −  𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
 
3) Equity ratio describes how much of the company’s assets have been funded 
with the company’s equity. In addition to share capital, equity also includes the 
provisions made under equity, and minority interests. 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 −  𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑
 
 
4) Current ratio measures the company’s liquidity on the closing date. 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
 
5) Net financing expenses describe how much of the company’s EBITDA is 
spent on financing expenses paid from liabilities (debts). 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
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